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1. Introduction 
Financial systems and the regulatory regimes that define them are crucial institutional 
elements of modern capitalist economies. Furthermore, major economic disruptions have 
also typically been associated with some manner of financial tumult – a point glaringly 
brought to the fore in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The ensuing debate 
concerning how financial regulation could have failed so badly, and the varying degrees to 
which this reflects differentiated national regulatory regimes, remains a topic of great 
interest. Neo-classical economic reasoning suggests that we may have expected to see a 
convergence over time to the most efficient financial model. Yet, the diversity that exists 
across developed economies, and the inertia that financial regulatory regimes often exhibit, 
presents an interesting focus for exploratory interdisciplinary comparative research. For 
example, why do governments in the United Kingdom traditionally favour a laissez-faire 
approach to intervention in financial markets, while German governments tend to limit the 
use of complex and diverse market instruments? Or, why has the United States historically 
adopted a minimalist approach to the regulation of hedge funds, while hedge funds were 
not permitted in much of continental Europe until the mid-2000s? The influence of 
organised economic interests, national electoral institutions, complementarities with 
corporate governance regimes, legal origins, or the legitimising power of social norms and 
policy paradigms, may provide an answer. Thus, this paper sets out to shed light on these 
and other factors that may assist in understanding the diversity of national financial 
regulatory regimes. 
 
By way of introduction, the remainder of Chapter 1 puts the financial system and its 
associated regulatory institutions in their broader economic context. In characterising 
financial regulatory regimes, a distinction is made between those which support bank-
based finance and those which support markets-based finance.  
 
Chapter 2 outlines three prominent approaches to understanding economic regulation in 
general. The ‘private interest’ approach attempts to understand government regulation as a 
reflection of the interests of influential and powerful organised groups. The ‘institutional’ 
approach emphasises the effect of institutions and different modes of coordination, and 
sees law and regulation as codified representations of individuals’ rule-like behaviour. 
Furthermore, this approach is used to explain how modes of coordination in different 
economic spheres can be complementary to each other, thereby producing a limited 
number of viable national institutional constellations, often referred to as ‘varieties of 
capitalism’. The ‘constructivist’ approach argues that the behaviour of economic agents 
must be understood with reference to their subjective ideas and beliefs, as well as the way 
in which social processes construct incentives and informal norms like legitimacy. 
 
Chapter 3 then establishes a methodological framework that as parsimoniously as possible 
combines the most important elements of these three approaches, in order to examine the 
determinants of different financial regulatory regimes. This framework is broadly in the 
tradition of Douglass North and the ‘new institutional economists’. Specifically, it is a 
combination of the comparative institutional analytical approaches of Masahiko Aoki and 
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Bruno Amable. It take Aoki’s ‘institutions as equilibrium summary representations’ 
concept and ‘synchronic-diachronic’ distinction, then incorporates Amable’s multi-tiered 
analysis of an institutional game-theoretic environment and its associated meta-
institutional environment. Broadly speaking, institutional complementarities, à la the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ literature, represent the static constraints on the choice set of 
financial regulatory institutions, restricting them to those that are consistent with other key 
coordination mechanisms in the economy. These represent equilibrium institutions arising 
out of a meta-institutional environment, which is influenced by two key elements: (i) the 
underlying political economy (private interests, collective action), and (ii) socialisation 
processes affecting informal norms (constructivist theory). 
 
Chapter 4 considers the various institutional complementarities that may exist between 
financial regulatory regimes and other economic spheres. In particular, the nexus that links 
the institutional structure of corporate governance and corporate finance, is examined in 
detail. In doing so, a model of corporate finance based on Albert O. Hirschman’s theory of 
‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ is developed, which provides a novel perspective on the 
adoption of either ‘outsider’ or ‘insider’ corporate governance models in response to 
different financial regulatory regimes. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the meta-institutional political economic processes that may affect the 
adoption of particular financial regulations at the institutional level. Specific cases of 
organised interests are examined in terms of the diachronic process by which their ability 
to acquire resources by overcoming free-rider dilemmas, may produce new equilibria 
within the financial regulatory structure. This provides particular new insights regarding 
the regulation of hedge funds and the ‘shadow banking’ industry. 
 
Chapter 6 examines how the financial regulatory institutional structure is mediated and 
refracted by informal norms and social constructs, which impose on the material context of 
action, and exist in the meta-institutional environment. Norms that establish the legitimacy 
of certain financial behaviours or relationships are discussed regarding their relative 
support for different regulatory architectures. In addition, the influences of socially 
constructed policy paradigms that structure discourse and define agendas are considered. In 
particular, changes in the dominant policy paradigm regarding hedge funds pre- and post-
Global Financial Crisis are examined. 
 
Chapter 7 outlines the main conclusions of the paper, and briefly discusses avenues for 
further research. 
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1.1 The Financial System in Modern Capitalism 
1.1.1 The Role and Function of Finance 
First and foremost, financial systems facilitate the allocation of capital across the almost 
infinite possible uses in a particular economic environment and can be spatial, temporal or 
functional. Naturally, this function of financial systems renders them indispensable to a 
coherent conception of capitalism, where the efficiency of the allocation of resources 
forms one of the cornerstones of its proposed normative justification. Secondly, the 
financial system facilitates transactions via the payments system. Consumers and 
businesses require the ability to make deposits with financial firms which are readily able 
to be withdrawn, in order to conduct their regular exchange activities. This type of deposit 
is not for the purpose of saving and importantly, should be analytically separated from the 
role other types of deposits play in the capital allocation mechanism. Thirdly, financial 
firms provide insurance products and services. By creating certain kinds of financial 
securities (including to an extent at-call deposits), financial firms are able to provide 
individuals and firms with insurance against undesirable outcomes, reflecting physical, 
financial or temporal uncertainty. Often scholars will present this insurance function as 
allowing consumption-smoothing in the face of random external shocks (Cochrane, 1991); 
but in reality, shocks (especially those of a financial nature) are rarely random, and as the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008 showed, can often be insufficiently minor in a 
systemic sense.1 In theory, the insurance function of financial firms is made possible 
because of the ability of firms to diversify across a large number of insurance holders, such 
that any individual misfortune does not significantly affect the overall viability of the 
insurance portfolio. However, this requires the assumption that individual losses will not 
be correlated, and in reality for many financial instruments, like the newly-conceived credit 
default swaps, default probabilities tend to have common causes. 
 
So although the neo-classical financial-economic model, which has at its core conceptual 
notions such as the ‘efficient market hypothesis’ (Malkiel & Fama, 1970), the ‘no-arbitrage 
principle’ (Ross, 1976) and so-called ‘risk-neutral pricing’ (Cox & Ross, 1976), has been 
increasingly challenged, it continues to form a significant part of the theoretical basis for 
the laissez-faire approach to financial regulation.  The clear under-regulation, or at least 
miss-regulation of financial institutions which occurred during the lead-up to the GFC, 
may in some way be a result of a continued misapplication of this largely out-dated 
underlying theory of banking and finance. One alternative, increasingly acknowledged 
model of capitalist finance posits that when economies experience extended periods of 
prosperity, the national and international financial edifice becomes increasingly fragile. 
Introduced by Minsky (1992) and termed the Financial Instability Hypothesis, the theory 
describes how during an expansionary phase, non-financial businesses are rewarded for 
high indebtedness, encouraging others to follow suit. Financial institutions are also eager to 
expand their balance sheets, and this optimistic economic environment engenders a 
willingness on the part of financiers to invest in risker financial assets. Ultimately 
however, this comes to an end, and firms, households and governments must undergo a 
                                                 
1
 For comprehensive reviews of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, see Stiglitz (2010) or Davies (2010).  
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painful period of de-leveraging. In such an environment, one might expect the most 
appropriate form of financial regulation to be vastly different to that which is 
recommended by traditional finance. One example is the use of counter-cyclical ‘macro-
prudential’ regulation, which is used sporadically across national jurisdictions, but does not 
engender much support from traditional financial theorists. This type of regulation is 
ultimately aimed at dampening fluctuations in the financial cycle, and uses a range of 
discretionary instruments in order to accomplish this outcome (for details, see Borio, 2003; 
Galati & Moessner, 2012). The most commonplace discretionary macro-prudential tools 
are variable loan-to-valuation ratios for lending, as well as flexible minimum capital and 
liquidity requirements. It is therefore not surprising to see that following the GFC, both 
national governments and international bodies have engaged in a close examination of the 
merits of expanding the use of such policies.    
 
 
1.1.2 Shadow Banking and Markets-based Intermediation 
Within the financial sector and in addition to traditional banks, other types of firms have 
begun to emerge over the past few decades, especially in the US and UK. These 
corporations perform the same kind of capital intermediation functions involving maturity 
and risk transformation that traditional banks have performed for centuries, but have a 
much more market-orientated banking model. Often referred to as ‘shadow banking’, these 
private investment firms include hedge funds, structured investment vehicles and money 
market funds. The assets of hedge funds in the US alone increased from around US$150 
billion in the early 1990s to around US$2 trillion a decade later (Lhabitant, 2006).  In fact, 
some estimates suggest that prior to the GFC, assets of the global shadow banking industry 
represented around US$60 trillion (Financial Stability Board, 2011). The nature of the 
intermediation performed by these firms is different to that of traditional banks in two 
important ways. Firstly, their assets are generally held, not as loans to firms or households, 
but as financial securities like corporate bonds or securitised mortgages, which are traded 
on financial markets. Secondly, unlike traditional banks, they are generally not funded by 
savings deposits, but instead borrow money on financial markets by issuing short-term 
debt securities.  
 
 
1.2 The Regulation of Finance: Characterising National Regimes 
At its most basic level, understanding economic regulation would start with a rationale for 
state intervention at a very primitive level. For example, Hobbes and those in his 
contractarian tradition see the state as external and internal protector whose laws and 
regulations represent consensual restraints on individuals, mutually agreed to on the basis 
of self-preservation. Often in economics, a similarly benign view of the state forms the 
most basic normative rationale for intervention in private economic matters. With the help 
of the oft-employed analytical device of the benevolent dictator, state intervention is seen 
as a means of solving a range of market failures and inefficiencies. For example, 
governments can attempt to ameliorate the inefficiencies associated with natural 
monopolies via price regulation or franchising (Viscusi, Vernon & Harrington, 1996). 
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Likewise, governments may impose taxes, regulation, or systems of property rights or 
liability, in order to take account of the social costs (or benefits) of particular activities, 
referred to as externalities, that are not incorporated into agents’ maximisation calculations 
and thus relative prices. Problems of information are also seen as suitable objects for 
government attention. Common to all these market-orientated theories of state intervention 
is the idea that the aim of policy-makers is to maximise social welfare or to target some 
notion of the public interest, and that they have the means and the prowess to do so. 
 
In many ways, the general public interest approach to state intervention outlined above 
readily lends itself to the analysis of financial systems and financial markets. However, 
there are also specific issues which are idiosyncratic to the nature of financial markets, 
financial firms, and the production and consumption of financial goods and services. 
According to Herring & Santomero (1999), there exist four broad rationales for financial 
regulation that purport to be in the public interest; namely, protecting consumers, 
enhancing efficiency, safeguarding against systemic crises, and achieving a range of other 
social objectives via the financial system. The first two fall broadly within the same 
intervention agenda as other markets and sectors in general; while the second two are areas 
that are largely specific to the financial system.  
 
The consumer protection rationale for regulation stems from the desire to avoid 
unjustifiably high consumer prices, which arise from limited competition, and monopolies 
at the extreme. This is no different in the financial sector and measures, such as anti-trust 
enforcement, are regularly employed by governments. Another consumer protection 
rationale stems from the idea that poorly-informed consumers can be vulnerable to 
incompetence, negligence or fraud on the part of financial firms. Chartering and stringent 
licencing function are often used to screen out potentially imprudent, incompetent or 
dishonest bank owners and managers. This rationale is popular amongst policy-makers for 
its seemingly clear public interest motive and is used to promote a range of regulatory 
measures. For example, disclosure requirements, whereby firms must release firm-specific 
financial information to the public, are designed to treat problems of asymmetric 
information. In this case, asymmetric information may arise in a principal-agent 
framework because consumers as depositors/investors (principals) do not have complete 
information about the activities of financial firms (agents). Deposit insurance schemes are 
also often promoted citing consumer protection as their justification. In this case, it is 
assumed that many depositors would find it either too costly or too difficult to monitor the 
behaviour of their bank, so deposit insurance protects them from inadvertently making 
poor financial decisions. It may be that, in the absence of deposit insurance schemes, many 
savers and potential lenders would prefer to hold cash, viewing the interest received from 
deposits insufficient compensation for the uncertainty surrounding their investment or to 
compensate for the costs associated with discerning the good banks from the bad. In this 
situation a sub-optimal supply of capital can arise.  
 
The enhancement of efficiency provides a further motive for financial regulation, which  is 
also shared by other sectors, and the type of instruments used, like providing market 
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infrastructure (clearing and settlement mechanisms, etc.), are not dissimilar to those 
applied elsewhere. In this context, efficiency means that financial markets provide more 
accurate price signals and as such, will more effectively deploy, transfer and allocate 
capital across time and under conditions of uncertainty (Gurley & Shaw, 1967). Accurate 
and abundant information regarding financial products and services are important drivers 
of efficient price discovery. Thus, disclosure standards imposed on financial institutions 
can serve not only a consumer protection rationale, but also an efficiency one. 
 
Thirdly, safeguarding the economy from systemic financial crises is an increasingly 
prominent rationale provided for financial regulation, and has become even more acute 
after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. A systemic crisis refers to, “the propagation 
of an agent's economic distress to other agents linked to that agent through financial 
transactions” (Rochet & Tirole, 1996, pp.733), also known as financial contagion, this can 
significantly disrupt the payments mechanism and capacity of the financial system to 
allocate capital. This is one of the unique features of the financial system that distinguishes 
it from other sectors, requiring a special approach to regulation (Davis, 1992). If failures 
were isolated to individual firms, there would not be as much of a problem; however, in 
financial markets more so than for non-financial firms, it is argued that there exists a 
complex network of inter-firm financial contracts for assets that can rapidly change in 
value. Therefore, even if the managers and owners of banks have appropriate incentives 
internally to respond to their own potential losses should their bank fail, there is no reason 
they should have adequate incentives to take account of the costs for the economy and 
society in general of their behaviour. There are often significant incentives for banks to 
engage in risky activities – increasing profitability at the expense of safety regarding both 
solvency and liquidity. So the rationale for a large proportion of financial regulation is to 
counteract the incentives for excessive risk taking. Leverage and capital requirements are 
classic examples of ways policy makers attempt to limit risk-taking by banks. While not 
perhaps regulation in the strict sense, having central banks act as ‘lenders of last resort’ in 
times of crisis and allowing financial institutions to borrow in the short term using long-
term assets as collateral rather than selling them as fire-sale prices, thus getting around the 
maturity transformation problem, is used as a means of propping up illiquid institutions. 
During the GFC and throughout the post-GFC period, this has been used extensively 
throughout the world, and is largely justified by policy-makers on systemic stability 
grounds.   
 
Finally, financial regulation can be used to pursue a range of social or political objectives 
deemed to be in the public interest. For example, support for the housing sector and for 
lending to ordinary households is an intervention in the financial sector that is popular 
among politicians and voters alike. In addition, many countries provide subsidised 
financing for exports, seen as a way to enhance growth. Many countries also use targeted 
financing in industry or regional policy, focussing on domestic areas deemed to be 
important for some reason or another. 
This multi-faceted nature of the function and purpose of financial regulation makes the 
identification of particular styles of regime and the characterisation of regulation an 
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important task. John Zysman’s (1983) book ‘Governments, markets, and growth: financial 
systems and the politics of industrial change’ is a pioneering examination of the different 
characters of national financial regimes. At the time, Zysman identified three main 
varieties of finance capitalism; namely ‘bank credit-based’, ‘government credit-based’, and 
‘capital market-based’. At the core of Zysman’s differentiation is the way that financial 
regimes act to influence the conduct of industrial activity. While government-led credit 
systems have largely been abandoned in developed economies over subsequent years, the 
distinction between capital-market-based financial systems and bank-based financial 
systems continues to be used by researchers in one form or another.2 Broadly speaking, in 
bank-based systems, a larger proportion of financial assets and liabilities consists of bank 
deposits and direct loans; while in market-based systems, securities that are tradeable in 
financial markets are more prominently used as a means of borrowing and lending  (Vitols, 
2001). The archetypal bank-based financial systems are Germany and Japan, where banks 
have traditionally been a driving force in the mobilisation of savings, the allocation of 
capital and the overseeing of investment decisions by corporations (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Levine, 1999). On the other hand, market-based financial systems tend to be observed in 
the Anglo-sphere nations, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, where firms 
borrow directly from securities markets, and decentralised processes like price signals 
drive the allocation mechanism (ibid). 
 
These different styles of finance can be seen in a number of characteristics of these 
national systems. For example, as of 2011, Germany’s Deutsche Börse traded around 670 
listed companies, compared with around 2000 on the London Stock Exchange (World 
Bank, 2013). In France there are around 900 listed companies, compared with almost 4,000 
in Canada (ibid). Furthermore, in Anglo-sphere countries like The United States, The 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, the market capitalisation of the stock market 
averages around 120 per cent of GDP, whereas it averages around 45 per cent in Germany,  
and around 75 per cent in France and Japan (FIGURE 1). 
                                                 
2
 For examples across a range of fields, see Levine (2000), Lütz (2000), Rajan & Zingales (2003), 
Chakraborty & Ray (2006). 
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A similar pattern can be seen in the relative importance of corporate bond markets across 
different nations. Again, countries like the US, and UK have relatively large corporate debt 
markets, whereby companies borrow directly from investors. On the other hand, in 
economies like Austria, Germany and Denmark, market-based debt is a comparatively 
minor source of funding for corporations. 
 
 
Furthermore, the relative importance of the market for corporate control shows similar 
divergence between economies, with the number of corporate mergers and acquisitions 
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recorded in the UK averaging around 4000 per year over the past decade, compared with 
around 2000 in Germany and France  (Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances, 
2013). Meanwhile, in the US there are over 10,000 reported per year (ibid). 
 
This bank- versus market-based distinction is also commonly applied to financial 
regulatory regimes, and is used to refer to systems that foster and support either of the 
different modes of finance. For example, Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003) argue that there is 
evidence to suggest that banking systems of the industrialised world cluster into roughly 
two types. These two types reflect the way in which policymakers attempt to protect 
against systemic financial crises. In the first case, regulation that limits competition in the 
banking sector like entry restrictions, and limits placed on financial market activities, acts 
to boost the profitability of banks, and at the same time reduces risk for depositors because 
profitability disinclines banks to take undue risks. This means of regulation is often 
referred to as ‘profit padding’, and is associated with bank-based financial systems (Sousa, 
2007). For example, the German bank-based regulatory model incorporates a tax system 
that tends to dis-incentivise the utilisation of liquid financial securities (Mettenheim & 
Butzbach, 2012). Similarly, the type of regulatory regimes which support bank-based 
financial systems tend to heavily restrict financial transactions which are made outside of 
formal exchanges or without centralised clearing houses. The second type of observed 
cluster of national financial regulatory regimes aims to promote competition and greater 
risk-taking in the financial system, but imposes measures like disclosure standards and 
capital requirements on financial institutions to promote system stability (Rosenbluth & 
Schaap, 2003). This is referred to as ‘prudential’ regulation, and is associated with 
markets-based systems. These systems tend to be characterised by regulatory instruments 
such as large supervisory agencies, through which the behaviour of financial institutions is 
monitored rather than controlled. Institutions tend to be coaxed rather than compelled by 
these regulatory bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the case of the 
US (Black & Jacobzone, 2009). Thus, under these regulatory regimes, institutions tend to 
be more free to conduct financial transactions and enter into financial contracts outside of 
centralised exchanges, which in the case of shadow banking permits to varying extents the 
creation of off-balance sheet financial exposures. So in line with the common distinction 
made between bank- and market-based systems, throughout this paper I will generally use 
a similar dichotomy; namely, between bank-orientated and market-orientated financial 
regulatory regimes. 
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2. Theories of Economic Regulation 
2.1 The Private Interest Approach 
Even though intuitively appealing, using the public interest approach to explain 
government intervention has been questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds. 
The challengers ultimately question both the assumptions of political omniscience and 
political benevolence in economic matters. Therefore, in  place of public interest theories 
of positive economics, there have emerged what are broadly called ‘private interest’ 
theories of economic policy-making.3 Pioneered by those such as Stigler (1971), Pelzman 
(1976) and Becker (1983), this approach argues that in attempting to address what are 
viewed as market failures, regulation may not solely reflect legislators’ desire to maximise 
the general welfare, but instead be driven by the interests of influential groups within a 
society. Stigler (1971) observed that regulation of industries often, in reality reflects the 
interests of exactly that regulated group – in other words policy is ‘captured’. For example, 
the interests of producers tend to be more influential in shaping regulatory legislation than 
consumers’ interests at large. For their notion of interest groups, these authors also rely 
heavily on Mancur Olson’s seminal work The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods 
and the Theory of Groups (1965). Olson saw the commonality of the goals of an interest 
group’s members as making the achievement of that goal a public good for that group, but 
also giving rise to incentives to ‘free-ride’. From this observation, Olson draws two 
conclusions. First, that the smaller the number of potential members, the easier it is to 
effectively organise an interest group. Secondly, interest groups that successfully represent 
a large number of individuals require selective incentives to be in place to counteract the 
free-rider problem. As a corollary, regulated industries that are effective at either 
restricting benefits or sanctioning non-contributors are more likely to exert their power to 
capture regulation. 
 
Beginning with studies of national trade policy, there also developed mounting empirical 
evidence that private interest groups were able to influence regulatory policy in their own 
favour. For example, a study by Grossman and Helpman (1994) suggests that that 
international trade policies can be viewed as objects ‘for sale’, with the policymaker as 
seller and special interest groups as buyers – a hypothesis supported by Baldwin (1989) 
and Goldberg & Maggi (1999), who find that the cross-sectional pattern of US trade policy 
is consistent with trade protection being higher in industries represented by organised 
interests.4  
 
In the financial sector, the influence of interest groups has also called into question the 
notion of public interest policy-making. In an influential empirical study, Barth, Caprio 
and Levine (2006) collected data from around 150 countries regarding financial regulatory 
practices, and statistically tested whether the range of measures applied by regulators 
actually matter when it comes to preventing financial market failures. Importantly, they 
                                                 
3
 Also called ‘public choice’, see Tullock, Seldon and Brady (2002) 
4
 Other examples include Lopez and Pagoulatos (1994) who find that trade protection is correlated with PAC 
contributions in the US; Trefler (1993) who finds that industry concentration affects political influence; 
Pelzman (1992) who finds a link between the strength of labour unions and trade protections. 
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find that common features of financial regulatory regimes around the world, like 
government-funded deposit insurance, do not appear to reduce the risk of countries 
experiencing financial crises, and in fact, in some cases, it appears they can increase their 
incidence. Another study by Heinemann and Schüler (2003) also finds that the stringency 
of supervisory regimes does not have a significant statistical impact on the likelihood of 
systemic banking crises when looking at data for 66 countries.  
 
 
2.2 The Institutional Approach 
2.2.1 Institutional Economics  
For the bulk of the private interest literature, it is either implicitly or explicitly assumed 
that the only salient type of institution one needs to consider is that of the market. Whether 
it be a focus on markets in the literal sense, or the use of analytical devices such as a 
marginal political calculus (Peltzman, 1976), the idea of the rational pursuit of self- interest 
in response to implicit prices as the only meaningful incentive-producing device are 
ubiquitous to the literature (Boettke, et al., 2005). However, markets and the use of 
marginal calculus and prices signals are just one type of coordinating mechanism at play in 
society. As Aoki (2001) describes, complete markets are rarely available in reality, so in 
their absence agents require alternative devices for informing choices. This causes the 
evolution of a range of different individual and collective decision-making, coordination or 
rule-establishing mechanisms that influence economic structures and the behaviour of 
individuals, groups and organisations. Such mechanisms like hierarchies and contracts, 
allow groups to overcome problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, re-enforce 
cooperation and reduce uncertainty, as well as reduce opportunistic behaviour (Amable, 
2003). Importantly, this means that the particular institutional arrangements at play can 
sometimes be the decisive element in economic and political outcomes. As North (1990) 
suggests, it us useful to understand institutions as representing the ‘rules-of-the-game’ that 
structure economic behaviour. In this sense, a rule can be an instruction, a principle, a 
regulation, or any directive or guide for action Amable (2003).  It is also important that, to 
qualify as an institution, most researchers assume that associated with a rule there must be 
some sort of sanction or reward. The extent to which an agent abides by a rule must imply 
some sort of external effect on their well-being. Ostrom states it simply as, “payoffs will be 
assigned to individuals dependent on their actions,” (Ostrom, 1990, p51). 
 
When talking about institutions, it is also common to separate ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ rules 
(Aoki, 2001). Formal rules are consciously articulated and codified constraints or 
guidelines for behaviour and include political rules like constitutions, economic rules like 
property rights (the right to both use and dispose of an economic resource (Demsetz, 
1967), or legal rules like contracts. In addition, some recognised authority must administer 
the sanctions associated with disobeying formal rules. Informal rules on the other hand, are 
not fully codified, and include social norms, moral codes, customs or conventions. 
Furthermore, informal rules do not typically involve formal sanctions, but instead rely on 
other types of social sanctions and rewards. These might include aspects like reputation, 
social status and self-esteem. In addition, informal rules are often followed, “without any 
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subjective formulation in thought of the ‘rule’,” (Weber, 1978, p.105). Since this paper 
seeks to understand regulation, and the extent to which institutions determine regulatory 
regimes, it may be tempting to focus solely on formal rules; however, formal and informal 
institutions are highly interrelated and connected (Sugden, 1986). Therefore it would be 
insufficient to focus on formal rules alone. 
 
As an example, an oft-cited example of a decisive and influential structural institutional 
characteristic is a nation’s electoral system, and how it can provide differing incentives for 
elected representatives seeking political support. As an extension of ‘Duverger’s Law’ 
(Duverger & Wagoner, 1972), whereby proportional representation generates a multiparty 
system and plurality generates two-party political competition, Cox’s (1990) makes the 
distinction between centripetal and centrifugal electoral systems. Centripetal systems are 
those which provide politicians with the incentive to pursue policies more in line with the 
preferences of the median voter (see Hotelling, 1929; Black, 1948; Downs, 1957). 
Centrifugal systems on the other hand, include proportional voting, and provide incentives 
for representatives to focus on the interests of smaller groups with intense preferences over 
certain policies. This arises because governments often rely on the formation of coalition 
governments, which involve policy log-rolls, whereby the collective action advantage of 
well-organised groups allows them to trade support for one another’s favoured policy 
(Buchannan & Tullock, 1962). Researchers have found empirical evidence that suggests 
that the type of electoral system can have an influence on the policies one would expect to 
observe across a range of policy areas.5 
 
Some authors also suggest that the institutional basis of a legal system can have discernible 
economic and political consequences. Hayek (1973) was a strong proponent of common 
law systems, as he argued that they promoted law-making that was consistent with 
society’s abstract norms of behaviour. As proponents of ‘Legal Origins Theory’, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (2008) argue that historical evidence suggests that civil law 
countries are more likely to pursue social objectives by implementing mandates and 
through government ownership, while common law countries prefer private contracting 
and litigation.  
 
 
2.2.2 Institutional Comparative Capitalism 
With one’s attention focussed on institutions and their effect on both micro-organisation 
and macroeconomic outcomes, it is a logical step to then examine the range of institutional 
structures on a cross-country basis. This research agenda examining ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ looks at how alternative political, legal, cultural and social institutions 
influence economic behaviour and affect economic outcomes, within a system where 
                                                 
5
 For example, Persson & Tabellini (1999) find that proportional systems tend to be associated with higher 
levels of government expenditures; Roubini and Sachs (1989) find that there tend to be larger deficits in 
countries characterised by the presence of many political parties in ruling coalitions; Rogowski and Kayser 
(2002) find that majoritarian electoral systems lower national price levels in the mean OECD country by 
between 10 and 17 per cent. 
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markets are the predominant device relied on to allocate scarce resources (Boettke et al., 
2005). For example, an early empirical study by Calmfors, Driffill, Honkapohja & 
Giavazzi (1988) explored the relationship between wage-setting institutions and economic 
performance. Contrary to the neo-classical view that real-wage levels would be lower the 
closer wage setting institutions are to competitive markets, the authors found that there is a 
non-monotonic relationship between centralisation of wage bargaining and wage levels. At 
high levels of decentralisation, real wages are low because single units are unable to exert 
pricing-power. However, at the other extreme, high degrees of centralisation can also 
produce wage moderation. This occurs because, with the right incentives, it allows social 
partners, in particular trade unions, to internalise the possible adverse effects of exorbitant 
wages growth in inflation, employment and productivity. Meanwhile in the intermediate 
case, where the parties can exert bargaining power, but do not have the correct incentives 
to care about broader economic interests, there is likely to be costly disruptions. As Olson 
(1982) describes, organised interests can be very harmful to a country’s economic 
performance if the external costs of their choices are not sufficiently encompassing to be 
internalised.  
 
This line of reasoning led authors like Hall & Soskice (2001) to attempt to differentiate 
developed economies according their institutional characteristics. More specifically, they 
argue that across modern capitalist systems there exist two very distinct constellations of 
complementary institutions. It is suggested that the presence or particular type of 
institution used in one sphere of coordination affects the effectiveness or efficiency of 
institutions in other areas, such that we would expect patterns of particular constellations to 
emerge. Importantly, the concept of ‘institutional complementarity’ is central to this 
understanding. They focus on five areas of institutional salience; namely industrial 
relations, education and vocational training, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and 
intra-firm coordination.  Following examination of the patterns across countries regarding 
these areas, they suggest that developed economies can be categorised broadly as 
representing one of two types of capitalism, either liberal market economies (LMEs) or 
coordinated market economies (CMEs). According to the theory, in LMEs firms 
coordinate with each other and with customers primarily through competitive markets 
characterised by formal contracting and ‘arm’s-length’ relationships. In these systems, 
organised labour is typically weak and employment and social protections are low. As a 
result, labour markets are fluid, and workers are said to have an incentive to invest in 
transferable skills. CMEs on the other hand are said coordinate on a strategic basis, where 
institutions support the formation of credible commitments, like information-sharing, and 
deliberation. These systems are characterised by relatively strong labour movements and 
industry associations. Employment and social protections are generally high, and longer 
job tenure tends to lead to specific skills acquisition. In addition, the management of firms 
is conducted in the context of consensual relationships and inter-firm collaboration. 
 
The core contentions of the “varieties of capitalism” perspective on comparative capitalism 
are empirically examined by Hall and Gingerich (2004). The authors devise indicators 
intended to gauge the character of coordination in different institutional spheres along a 
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spectrum, running from market-based to strategic-based interaction. They perform a factor 
analysis on a set of institutional variables in order to isolate a single latent variable or 
‘principle component’ representing the overall economy-wide character of coordination.6 
In a sample of 20 OECD countries and using data taken from between 1990 and 1995, the 
authors do indeed find such a factor. The authors also test whether there is an identifiable 
relationship between this underlying character of coordination index and the growth 
performance of countries. Mirroring the findings of Calmfors et al (1988) with respect to 
centralisation labour institutions, Hall and Gingerich (2004) also find a non-monotonic U-
shaped relationship, indicating that more “pure” types of coordination, lying at either the 
market-based or strategic-based ends of the coordination spectrum, tend to outperform 
those economies with a mixture of both in terms of macroeconomic performance. 
 
Similarly to other spheres of the political economy, the determinants of financial 
regulatory regimes are also likely to be to a large extent related to the institutions that 
prevail in various spheres of the economy. Superficially and anecdotally, the distinction 
made in the Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall & Soskice, 2001) between liberal 
market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME) also appears 
somewhat apt when looking at the character of coordination and regulatory institutions in 
the financial sphere. In a stylised way, in the LME Anglo-sphere countries there seems to 
be a tendency towards dispersed corporate ownership, information disclosure and a fluid 
market for corporate control (Davis, 2011). This corresponds broadly with the market-
based system of finance described in Section 1.2. Conversely, countries classified as CMEs 
are often characterised by concentrated corporate ownership structures, limited public 
trading of stock and heavy reliance on bank-loan finance, and therefore tend to resemble 
the bank-based type of financial system. Using a measure of the relative importance of 
market-based finance, calculated as the total size of stock and bond markets, FIGURE 3 
suggests that economies typically identified in the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ literature as 
LMEs tend to have a much heavier reliance on market-based finance; whereas those 
typically identified as CMEs tend to rely much less on this type of finance.   
                                                 
6
 The institutional variables used were Shareholder power; Dispersion of control; Size of stock market; Level 
of wage coordination; Labor turnover; Degree of wage coordination 
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Furthermore, there also appears to be a significant negative correlation between the relative 
importance of market finance and the Hall & Gingerich (2004) index of the character of 
coordination.7 
 
The Varieties of Capitalism approach has also begun to be applied to issues debates over 
current controversies regarding the GFC, the Euro Crisis and financial regulation, with the 
embattled process of establishing EU banking union being one recent example (See Hall 
(2012); Heyes, Lewis & Clark (2012)). For instance, the concerns of many member states 
of the EU over having centralised supervisory power over the smaller public, regional or 
cooperative banks, are likely to be the result of the key role in which these providers of 
finance play in the particular national mode of capitalism. In Germany there is particularly 
strong opposition to ceding supervisory control of its banking sector, which includes the 
politically influential “Landesbanken”. This type of bank has close ties to regional 
governments, and together with the publicly owned savings banks, make up around 40 per 
cent of bank assets in Germany (Hüfner, 2010).  
 
 
2.3 The Social Constructivist Approach 
The theories of capitalist institutions and institutional complementarity discussed above 
relate broadly to the formal type of institution – termed ‘functional’ or ‘liberal’ 
institutionalism by some authors (Hall and Taylor, 1996). However, as mentioned above, 
non-codified or informal institutions also play a significant role in coordinating behaviour 
and guiding economic decision-making. Institutions such as social norms and conventions, 
as well as inter-subjectively held beliefs and ideas are likely to affect the fundamental 
social and economic structure in salient and tangible ways. 
                                                 
7
 FIGURE 3 also includes a third common classification – ‘Mediterranean Market Economies’. For details, 
see Geffen, & Kenyon (2006).   
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Firstly, informal norms constitute what a particular group considers to be a ‘legitimate’ 
formal regulatory institution. There needs to exist some consistency between the formal 
regulatory institutional infrastructure and the underlying informal norms that provide the 
foundational social order. As argued by North (1990), even if countries transplant formal 
rules, dissatisfaction may be engendered because deeper informal norms tend to be more 
inert and slow to change. In such cases, borrowed institutions may be neither followed nor 
enforced. This is especially important when dealing with sanctions. When sanctions are 
delivered, the authority delivering such a sanction must be considered legitimate by the 
relevant group, and this legitimacy is inherently inter-subjective and is derived from 
complex social processes. 
 
Secondly, even if there is a well-defined formal regulatory institutional structure, the 
incentives it generates, the behaviour it induces, and the interpretation of the meaning of 
that system will be dependent on the inter-subjectively held belief systems of the relevant 
groups. These are ultimately social phenomena and cannot be reduced to a material or 
structural representation of the environment. As highlighted by Wendt (1999) with 
reference to international relations, before one seeks to understand interests and incentives, 
one must understand the beliefs that lie behind them. North (1990) also accepts that 
understanding the incentives produced by formal institutions requires the understanding of 
how agents represent those incentives within the broader set of informal norms of identity, 
belief and meaning. These belief systems can be interpreted both as conventions of 
behaviour on the collective level or scripts that govern action on the individual level 
(Dobbin, 1994). In both cases, they are coordination mechanisms based on shared norms 
that are self-sustaining, largely by being reconstituted by agents’ repeated practices over 
time. On both the collective and individual level, the way in which formal institutions 
interact and produce economic and political outcomes is mediated by social factors. The 
key is that inter-subjective beliefs create causal relationships beyond the material context 
of action. 
 
 
3. Methodological Framework – A Multi-tier Institutional Approach  
Following Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis (1999), comparative research and analysis 
should aim to be one of two broad types, either exploratory or corroboratory. The 
‘explorative’ type attempts to identify relationships, which may then be conductive to 
theory formation. The second type is driven by pre-existing theory and aims at testing 
specific causal hypotheses, which is a necessary step in corroborating the extant theory – 
termed the ‘corroborative’ type. Therefore, the choice between the two largely depends on 
that availability of plausible existing theories to be tested. Chapter 2 described a number of 
plausible approaches one could take if one were attempting to understand the causes and 
determinants of financial regimes across nations and over time. Unfortunately, however, no 
single explanation provided above seems to present itself and unqualifiedly superior, nor 
do any seem unequivocally without merit. The public interest view has obvious normative 
appeal, and to the extent that economic policy can be meaningfully evaluated in such a 
way, it is useful in that it provides a benchmark that we can use to judge observed financial 
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practices. However, as a tool of positive economic analysis, its limitations are clear. As the 
global financial crisis plainly (and painfully) demonstrated, financial regulation across the 
globe is far from being considered as aligned with the public interest, and beyond this, 
empirical evidence broadly does not tend to support this approach (Potters and Sloof, 
1996). Private interest-based explanations go some way in bettering our understanding, and 
fit much better with the apparent tendency for financial regulatory policy to be favourable 
for powerful and well-organised groups. However, the extent to which groups and 
coalitions can organise, and the way in which private interests are represented in public 
policy will be to a large extent mediated by a nation’s institutional infrastructure. The 
institutional approach, and in particular a focus on institutional complementarities and 
varieties of capitalism appears to provide a fairly accurate topography and static foundation 
for observed national capitalist economic systems. However, this literature is yet to 
thoroughly examine financial regulatory regimes. Furthermore, it tends to treat formal 
institutions as largely exogenous, and does not address latent demand for institutional 
change. Finally, the constructivist approach allows the understanding of the extent to 
which formal institutions and policies are consistent with a society’s norms, beliefs, 
identities and ideas, thus giving indications as to their initial acceptability, durability, 
sustainability and effectiveness. However, generally applied social explanations can often 
be vague, and so require concurrent detailed circumstantial, comparative and historical 
analysis.  
 
Consequently, while there exists a patchwork of literature made up of individual 
contributions from the approaches described above, it can really only enable an incomplete 
and piecemeal understanding of the diversity of financial regulatory regimes. It therefore 
appears to be a worthwhile endeavour to attempt some manner of synthesis of these 
approaches with respect to financial regulation. Then once some more general theoretical 
framework which incorporates all three approaches has been established with respect to 
financial regimes, this itself can be tested as a whole on a corroborative basis. Furthermore, 
in the case of the regulation of ‘shadow-banking’ and hedge funds, there are very limited 
established theories, especially those that adopt a domestic political-economic perspective.  
Consequently, the methodological approach I adopt falls under the ‘explorative’ category. 
So in order to come to an understanding of the most salient determinants of financial 
regulatory regimes, this chapter develops a framework that relatively parsimoniously 
combines the most important elements of these approaches. It is designed to produce a 
framework that is useful in identifying and evaluating key relationships in financial 
regulation, and then using these relationships to tentatively produce hypotheses regarding 
financial regulatory regimes. The aim of this paper is not to directly test the 
methodological framework itself, nor does it make a direct comparison of cases. Evidence 
is gathered in a somewhat ad hoc fashion from a range of national cases in order to inform 
and be conducive to the formation of a more general theory, which may then be more 
directly tested by further comparative research.    
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3.1 Two Tiers and Three Pillars 
For these reasons, the framework I propose consists of ‘two tiers’ and ‘three pillars’. The 
‘three pillars’ refers to the simultaneous use of private interest theories, institutional 
theories and social constructivist theories to inform the analysis. The ‘two tiers’ aspect 
refers to my intention to attempt to isolate the complementarities in the formal financial 
institutional structure on one tier, but attempt to endogenise this by using a second tier, 
which represents the latent demands of private interests, informal institutions and social 
processes. I follow those like Aoki (2001), and make the multi-level distinction in matters 
of comparative institutional analysis, between problems of ‘synchronicity’ and problems of 
‘diachronicity’. A synchronic understanding of institutions means taking the set of overall 
institutional possibilities that we observe as given, and providing explanations for why 
various constellations and configurations occur in particular ways and not others. 
Institutions in one sphere or another are not independent, autonomous and isolated, but 
instead exist as some internally coherent and consistent whole. A diachronic understanding 
focuses on the mechanisms that underlie institutional evolution and change, but is also 
consistent with an equilibrium view of institutions. It acknowledges path-dependence and 
the importance of historical information, as existing rules can shape incentives for how to 
innovate and transact, which potentially generate fundamental shifts in the underlying 
game structure.  
 
However, this endogeneity comes at a cost, as it is difficult to come up with an analytical 
procedure that allows all things to be determined within the system, while at the same time 
is sufficiently determinate to provide concrete pathways and understanding. It would be 
clearly impossible to contemplate the entire set of theoretically feasible institutional 
equilibria across all spheres of politics and economics, and then to use deductive reasoning 
to choose between them. So in the area of comparative institutional analysis, many authors 
suggest that when looking at a particular situation, it is possible to make a distinction 
between the institutions that may be considered exogenous in that particular circumstance, 
and those endogenous outcomes to be understood.8 That is not to say that some institutions 
aren’t changeable, but rather that for the purpose of examining specific contexts, historical 
factors as well as some of the more entrenched institutions can be taken as given. Grief 
(1998) describes such an analytical procedure for exploring institutional “emergence 
perpetuation and change,” (ibid, p.80) using context-specific information. It is an 
essentially two-step process, whereby historical and comparative, as well as technological 
and resource information is firstly used to determine the exogenous institutional factors. 
Then secondly, a context-specific game-theoretic model is constructed based on those 
exogenous rules, and then solved to identify equilibria. One way to interpret this multi-
tiered approach is to imagine that in some circumstances, agents take certain institutions 
and the equilibrium outcomes of some games, as given. By way of a visual representation, 
this multi-tiered framework is shown in FIGURE 4.  
                                                 
8
 See Greif (1998), Aoki (2001), Amable (2003). 
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3.2 The Lower-tier Institutional Game: The Problem of Synchronicity 
3.2.1 Institutions as Equilibria 
The comparative institutional approach introduced above relies heavily on the use of 
institutions as an analytical device, so requires a meaningful definition of an institution that 
is suitable for this purpose. According to the prominent work of North, 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction… in the jargon of 
the economist, institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals,” 
(North, 1990, p3-4) 
The important aspect of these ‘rules’ is that they are only a subset of the physically feasible 
actions available in human interaction, and are constraints that go beyond the technological 
and environmental options. According to Aoki (2001), there are two indispensable aspects 
of coordinating rules that qualify them as institutions. Firstly, they must be relatively stable 
in order for agents to rely on them to coordinate their behaviour. Secondly, agents must 
believe that the sanctions and rewards associated with an institution are credible, and 
therefore the rules must be self-reinforcing. One way to include both of these pre-requisites 
is to take an equilibrium view of institutions and conceptualise them as coordination 
devices that have developed as the outcome of agents interacting in a repeated-game-
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theoretic setting. Utilising the formal tools of game theory, Hurwicz (1996) provides a 
formal specification of the elements of an institution. Firstly, one must specify the set of 
agents who are able to take substantive action in a particular setting. These could be 
individual agents, group agents, or organisations. Secondly, the set of technologically 
feasible actions available to each agent must be specified. This is often termed the ‘choice 
set’, and where actions are sequential, the exhaustive set of actions for each potential 
choice, even if unrealised, is called a ‘strategy’. Thirdly, the differentiated states of the 
world that correspond with each particular configuration of agents’ actions needs to be 
defined. This rule, which assigns a state of the world to each ‘strategy profile’ is often 
called an ‘outcome’ or ‘consequence function’. Finally, each agent’s preferences over the 
respective states of the world needs to be defined, such that, via their choices, they seek to 
achieve more highly preferred states of the world.  
 
Referring back to the two key elements of an institution described above, in order to 
incorporate stability into the definition of an institution in this game-theoretic setting, the 
‘strategy profile’ must therefore be an equilibrium. Typically this is assumed to be a Nash 
equilibrium (or more specifically a subgame perfect equilibrium), whereby each agent 
chooses a strategy that, given the strategies of the other agents, produces their most 
preferred state of the world (Selten, 1975). When one describes an institution in terms of 
an equilibrium rule of behaviour, it is important to also consider the application and 
enforcement of sanctions and rewards, and the degree to which it is self-re-enforcing – the 
second stipulation above. It may be tempting to assume that some external agent is able to 
provide enforcement; however, when looking at the most fundamental institutions, such as 
constitutions, the question of enforcer incentives becomes acute. The question of who 
provides the incentives for the enforcers to correctly apply sanctions and rewards easily 
turns into one of infinite regress, when layers of enforcement are applied. However, one 
way to address this is to include the enforcer as an agent in the game-theoretic abstraction, 
and to consider the institutions that coordinate the enforcer’s behaviour as also being an 
equilibrium strategy. Basically, the incentives associated with the enforcement of sanctions 
and rewards inherent in an institution must themselves be the result of equilibrium play.   
 
Therefore, in my analysis of financial regulatory regimes, I will adopt this ‘institution-as-
an-equilibrium approach, and define an institution as the set of rules, instructions, 
guidelines or principles that describes the sub-game perfect equilibrium ‘strategy profile’ 
of all agents in a particular setting. 
 
 
3.2.2 Institutions as Psychological Equilibria 
One extremely difficult task, however, is to succinctly yet richly embed the influence of 
beliefs and cognition into a relatively general institutional framework. The method I will 
follow is based largely on Aoki’s (2001) ‘equilibrium-as-summary-representation’ 
approach. It adopts the standard ‘institution-as-an-equilibrium’ approach described in 
section 2.2.1, but adds a crucial modification to the information capabilities that agents are 
assumed to possess. Importantly, agents are assumed to be neither in possession of, nor 
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indeed be capable of, complete knowledge regarding all the game structures (ie. agents, 
strategy profiles and consequence functions) in which they are involved. Instead, agents 
form ‘subjective game models’ representing largely incomplete cognitive approximations 
of how the game is structured, and as agents repeatedly interact, their subjective game 
models come to resemble one another’s, albeit imperfectly. Nonetheless, the effect of 
repeated interaction and the updating of beliefs provides boundedly rational agents with a 
salient means by which to coordinate their behaviour, which, importantly, superimposes 
onto the physical/environmental game structure. Hence, an institution can be interpreted as 
that common component of the players’ subjective game models that allows them to 
functionally coordinate; namely, the shared beliefs about the structure of the game. 
Crucially, the incorporation of beliefs does not mean that we must dispense with the 
underlying notion of a Nash equilibrium. In fact, we can use the definition of a 
‘psychological Nash equilibrium’ (Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1989) to illustrate 
this point. Agents continue to act according to their best response, but now it is relative to 
their beliefs about other players’ beliefs, which are in fact about the original player’s 
beliefs and so on. Despite this iterative nature,  Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) 
show that even in psychological games, at least one sub-game perfect equilibrium exists – 
that there is at least one ‘strategy profile’ where it is not beneficial to deviate, as long as 
agents’  beliefs are sustained regarding other agents. 
 
Representing institutions in this way allows for a range of path-dependent social process to 
substantively affect economic outcomes. Many institutions indeed exist merely because 
agents believe they exist (take any one of the seemingly arbitrary behaviours humans 
engage in), and even once the initial conditions which gave rise to a particular equilibrium 
have changed, the summary and representational nature of institutions means that they can 
still function as effective coordination devices. However, there is also the possibility that 
when circumstances change, either because agents’ summary representations produce 
sufficiently adverse consequences, or their content is somehow de-legitimised on other, 
possibly normative grounds, agents are faced with a cognitive institutional crisis and must 
re-examine their choice rules (strategies) based on new information. Through a process of 
re-adjustment, a new institutional equilibrium will then emerge, after agents’ subjective 
game models converge once again, and their summary representations become a broadly 
mutually consistent common representation.  
 
 
3.2.3 The Nature of Complementarities 
Thus far, my methodology with respect to institutions has focused on each institutional 
setting in isolation. However, as argued in Section 2.2, the type of institution in one 
particular setting can drastically affect the payoffs and incentives for agents in other 
institutional settings, and possible complementarities between games or situations have 
consequences for the overall architecture of an economy. In a loose sense, a constellation 
of institutions should be coherent/consistent, in that there should not be large 
contradictions between institutions in different settings. But more than that, the 
consequence/outcome functions in one setting are likely to depend on the equilibria in 
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other settings, such that some strategies will have their payoff enhanced, while others will 
become less preferred. Authors also sometimes discuss complementarity in terms of some 
aggregate performance measure. This may be useful for empirical work, however, the 
conceptual difficulties with either identifying a suitable economic variable or aggregating 
preferences via interpersonal comparison make them less suitable for the purposes of this 
paper. 
 
 One may consider three types of complementarity; namely, differential, semi-quantitative 
and strong (Amable, 2003).  In a situation where institutional choice is made by choosing a 
value from continuous action-set variable, differential complementarity arises when the 
marginal utility of one institutional variable is positive with respect to another. However, it 
is rare that we are presented with institutional choice variables that fall along continuums; 
therefore, we require some definition that allows discrete numerical values. The semi-
quantitative definition is based on the notion of supermodularity. Specifically, in the case 
where utility is a function of the institutional form taken in one or more settings, and the 
institutional from can be represented by an ordered discrete variable, supermodularity 
means that the incremental utility gained from choosing a higher discrete value is greater 
when the discrete value corresponding to another institutional form is also higher (Topkis, 
2001). Unfortunately, we are also not often faced with institutional forms that can be easily 
represented by an ordered numerical variable, so one needs some way of evaluating 
complementarity in terms of qualitative variables. In cases like this the notion of strong 
complementarity can be used. It simply implies that, again in cases where utility is a 
function of institutional forms, the level of utility declines when the institutional form is 
changed in one sphere, while leaving the others unchanged. 
 
Strong complementarity can be illustrated by considering two institutional settings, A and 
B, where the discrete institutional form can be α or α’ in A, and can be β or β’ in B. The 
payoffs to each player ‘i’ engaged in this institutional setting are a function, fi(.), of choice 
of institution across both spheres. FIGURE 5 illustrates this structure in its institutional 
matrix formulation (Amable, Ernst & Palombarini, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
α β'
β f i(α,β) i(α',β)
β' (α,β') (α',β')
A
B
FIGURE 5: Institutional-form Matrix
f 
f i f i
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Furthermore, following the formulation of, the institutional form α in the institutional 
sphere A is said to strongly compliment the institutional form β in institutional sphere B if 
and only if, 
(, ) ≥ (, ′) and (, ) ≥ (′, ), for all i’s 
 
 
3.3 The Upper-tier Meta-game: The Problem of Diachronicity 
The problem of synchronicity described in the game-theoretic terms above, provides a 
succinct way to understand firstly, the nature of institutions, and secondly, the way in 
which institutional forms can impact on behaviour in other spheres. However, when we 
attempt to fully endogenise the non-physical environment, which as described is essential 
for a meaningful conception of institutions, we leave ourselves with possibly too 
indeterminate initial conditions. Furthermore, even if this were possible, there is the 
possibility that many different sub-game perfect equilibria exist in one environment, and to 
say that one set of agents' strategies is self-reinforcing once already being played is to say 
very little, unless one also provides a way to distinguish between the multitude of possible 
set’s institutional equilibria. We require more information as to why a certain institution 
comes to exist in one place and another comes to exist elsewhere; or more specifically, 
what are the salient diachronic aspects of initial conditions, beyond endowments, 
technology and preferences, that one needs to consider when determining why a stable 
coordinating mechanism exists in the place of other feasible candidates. Following Greif 
(1994), these self-enforcing non-technological constraints on human interactions will be 
assumed to be composed of two interrelated elements; namely, cultural beliefs about how 
individuals perceive their environment, and secondly, how individuals organise themselves 
into human constructs that alter the structure of institutional games. Thus in looking at the 
formation of financial regulatory institutions, the diachronic factors I focus on here are 
twofold. The first refers to the effect of the strategic behaviour of organised private 
interests as described in Section 2.1, whose collective action capabilities and influence on 
the game structure are highly context dependent. The second factor refers to the social 
process that as described in Section 2.3, produce the beliefs, ideas and desires that 
determine how agents differentially represent the institutional environment. 
 
 
3.3.1 The Political-Economic Diachronic Process 
The process by which humans form organisations can be characterised in an abstract sense 
as the repeated interaction of individuals causing them to cluster into different groups 
based on the relative proximity of their economic interests, and a range of social forces 
(Amable, 2003). The demand by these groups for the protection of specific interests may 
then see them coalesce into effective ‘socio-political groups’, who form in order to express 
a common political goal. As suggested by Knight (1992), at this pre-institutional stage, 
there is a significant degree of conflict over resource distribution arising out of the 
heterogeneity of endowments and interests. However, in the same way that they act to 
mediate the conflict arising out of ex ante heterogeneity, they also leave residual ex post 
heterogeneity, a result of which produces fresh demand for new institutions. North (1990) 
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characterises this as latent demand for new rules and for institutional change, and suggests 
that the “political market” (ibid, p.52) will decide whether this latent demand can be 
formally expressed. Here, the choice of institutions reflects some political equilibrium as a 
stable compromise over distributional conflicts. Knight (1992) describes a model that 
attempts to explain how these group agents act strategically in the ‘political market’ in 
order to influence institutional choice, where, as described above, the choice of institution 
is a choice between multiple equilibria. He shows that ex ante distributional conflict is 
resolved without coercion, but also that the equilibrium favours the more powerful actor. 
‘Power’ according to Knight, describes an actor’s ability to credibly pre-commit to a 
threat, which is a function of risk attitude and time constraints. According to Knight these 
can be adequately reflected in relative endowments, such that those with the larger initial 
resource endowments can expect to achieve a more favourable equilibrium institutional 
form. Power-based and bargaining approaches like this, however, tend to partially 
disregard the collective action dilemmas faced by many groups. As described in section 
2.1, the insight of Olson (1965) was that relative sizes of endowments or the distribution of 
income are not necessarily accurate indicators of the political power of different groups. 
Thus for a complete understanding of the political influence of different groups in altering 
the financial regulatory institutional game structure, I will depart from those like Knight 
(1992), and conceptualise the costs and benefits that arise in a bargaining framework to be, 
to a significant extent, affected by the collective action capabilities of the various groups 
involved, rather than purely endowments. 
 
 
3.3.2 The Social Diachronic Process 
Section 1.4 described how social process and informal norms can have substantive 
economic consequences through a range of channels. In examining financial regimes, I will 
focus on two prominent broad strands. The first is through legitimating constitutive social 
norms in the Weberian tradition, whereby informal non-economic norms inform 
legitimation processes that drive institutional and social change (Seabrooke, 2006). The 
second is in line with the paradigmatic approach of those like Kuhn (1970) and Hall 
(1993), whereby social forces determine the dominant sets of ideas and underlying 
intellectual assumptions in a field. In the ‘multi-tiered institutional’ framework, these are 
diachronic effects, reflected in the transition dynamics between institutional equilibria.  
 
But what sort of processes characterises this transition phase? Aoki (2001), along with 
those like Sugden (1986), adopt a largely evolutionary approach, whereby an institution 
establishes itself without conscious design and where agents develop strategies under the 
pressure of competitive evolutionary selection. Competitive pressures are likely to play a 
role, however, this omits a range of other ways in which agents adjust their subjective 
beliefs in disequilibrium. Therefore, I propose to use the three socialisation processes from 
Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons (2005) described as a guide to understanding the 
disequilibrium social dynamics of the institutional game; namely, persuasion, socialisation, 
and manipulation.  Firstly, ‘socialisation’ processes involving particular symbolic systems 
and ideational norms can act to guide agents towards common representations. In this 
Betts: The Politics and Economics of Financial Regulation 
 
25 
 
process symbolic systems may compete, and via repetition or imitation, one may prevail as 
the dominant focal point. This process is most in line with the evolutionary approach of 
Aoki (2001) and emphasises the emergent nature of new social foundations for institutions 
that are largely consensual. However, the subjective game models of agents and the way 
they form common summary representations of the salient features of a particular 
institutional game are also likely to be affected by social persuasion and manipulation. 
‘Persuasion’ refers to the notion that the entrepreneurial actions of innovative individuals 
create new interpretations of material circumstances, which may be adopted by others. 
Whether or not this occurs is often explained by either the appeal of these new concepts 
with respect to the legitimacy of existing ideas or norms, or some inherent imitable 
qualities of the persuasive individual, regardless of the content of the new ideas. Finally, 
‘manipulation’ refers to the process whereby certain individuals employ deception or some 
sort of powerful authority in order to make others accept or rationalise a particular new 
idea. Crucially, within a population at any given time, the process that led to the 
establishment of a well-entrenched norm or idea is likely to include a combination of all 
three mechanisms.  
 
 
4. Varieties of Corporate Finance – Exit, Voice and Institutional 
Complementarity 
Using the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 3, the remainder of this paper will 
describe the factors, under the headings of the three ‘pillars’, that contribute to the 
existence of different types of financial regulatory regimes. In particular, whether the 
regulatory regime is likely to support ‘bank-based’ or ‘market-based’ finance. In 
proceeding, the remainder of Chapter 4 discusses the lower-tier exogenous and endogenous 
synchronic institutional factors, highlighting the effect of institutional complementarities. 
A model of corporate finance which provides a mechanism for the nexus between the 
financial regulatory regime and corporate governance, is also outlined.    
 
 
4.1 Exogenous Synchronic Financial Regulatory Institutions 
Section 3.1 described how one way to reduce the number of unknowns when considering a 
system of formal institutions, is to assume that in some institutional spheres, agents take as 
given the equilibrium outcomes in more fundamental institutional games. Therefore, when 
examining the determination of financial regulatory institutions, we must attempt to find 
those synchronic institutional relationships that agents take as given when forming their 
strategies, but yet influence financial regimes. 
 
 
4.1.1 Electoral Institutions and Financial Regulatory Regimes 
Ostrom (2009) discusses a possible hierarchy of rules where those at a constitutional level, 
such as electoral rules, require a significant change in the deep political economy and 
Betts: The Politics and Economics of Financial Regulation 
 
26 
 
system of social norms and beliefs.9 Over a long horizon, one might expect electoral 
institutions to change, as they did in Japan and New Zealand during the 1990s, but it does 
not seem unreasonable to assume that for the most part, these are assumed to be fixed 
when agents determined their strategies in financial-institutional games. A political-
economic model where the political incentives of banks, bank customers, and labour are 
determined by the way political preferences are amalgamated by a jurisdiction’s electoral 
rules and legislative institutions is presented by Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003). As 
described in Section 2.2, even with the same underlying distribution of political 
preferences, centrifugal systems tend to motivate political parties to represent the intense 
preferences of particular groups, implying that these systems tend to show more favourable 
policy towards influential groups. In the case of finance, all else being equal, it is likely 
that financial firms possess a collective action advantage over the average depositor, so 
acting as traditional Stiglerian regulators, financial regulators may be more likely to create 
transfers from the consumers to the producers of financial services in centrifugal 
(proportional) systems. Therefore, in such systems we would expect ceteris paribus to 
observe relatively high costs of financial services for the average consumer and financial 
regulation that protects financial firms from competition. In other words, a ‘profit-padding’ 
style regulatory regime that supports bank-based finance. In centripetal (majoritarian) 
systems on the other hand, politicians tend to implement policies that appeal to the mass of 
voters in the middle of the ideological spectrum (see above) and form policies with the 
interests of a large and heterogeneous pre-election group of constituents in mind.  As such, 
all else being equal, one might expect higher levels of competition in the financial sector in 
these jurisdictions, and as a consequence, relatively low retail prices for financial services. 
Furthermore, system stability is likely to be ensured in these systems via ‘prudential’ style 
supervision, thereby supporting the markets-based financial model.  
 
As a rough test of the general proposition that competition is higher in centripetal 
(majoritarian) systems, Rosenbluth & Schaap (2003) perform a statistical test of the 
relationship between banks’ average net interest margin (which is a proposed proxy for 
competition) and an electoral rule measure that characterises its centrifugal versus 
centripetal nature – called the ‘effective threshold’.10 Using data from twenty-two countries 
between 1980 and 1998, they find that a switch from a pure majoritarian to a pure 
proportional system is associated with a 0.5 to 2.0 percentage point increase in the interest 
rate spread.11  
                                                 
9
 Ostrom (2009) identifies a hierarchy consisting of constitutional-choice rules, which specify how collective-
choice rules are determined, which themselves create operational rules which govern day-to-day decisions 
and behaviour. 
10
 The net interest margin is equal to the difference between the rate banks receive on loans and the rate they 
pay to depositors, and is considered by the authors as a rough proxy for competition because higher margins 
suggest that competition has not eroded excess revenues. The effective threshold is based on Lijphart (1995) 
and is the median between the minimum vote share required for a party to gain representation and the 
maximum vote share a party can receive without gaining representation.   
11
 Some caveats, however, should be mentioned regarding their methodology. The researchers estimate their 
model as a time-series cross-sectional regression (panel) using random effect rather than fixed effects. This 
would seem to overstate the strength of their results because using random effects treats each observation as 
independent and excludes the possibility of unobserved country-specific characteristics. 
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Sousa (2007) also argues that electoral systems constitute an important determinant of 
financial regulatory regimes, and empirically tests the relationship using eight-year-
average data up to the year 2003, and included between 69 and 83 countries, depending on 
model specification and data availability. A multinomial logistic regression technique was 
used, which estimates the probability of a variable taking on a discrete value, in this case 
either one of the four regime types, relative to some reference category. Interestingly, the 
results starkly contrasted the expected relationship and the empirical findings of 
Rosenbluth and Schapp (2003). When comparing ‘prudential’ versus ‘profit-padding’ 
financial regulatory regimes, it was found that centripetal (majoritarian) systems increase 
the likelihood of ‘profit-padding’ regulation. This may be explained by the expansion in 
the sample of countries or may perhaps be due to the different sample period and 
estimation technique.  
 
Further to this hypothesis, a specific case study of changes in a nation’s electoral rules can 
be found in Japan in the mid-1990s. In 1994 electoral rules changed, moving the system 
from one which was more centrifugal in that it supported the existence of smaller parties, 
to one which was more centripetal, encouraging two-party competition (Christensen, 
1996). This change is likely to have produced significant changes of incentives for 
collective action across the economy. Since World War II, Japan’s financial system has 
been dominated by bank-finance, and number of regulatory restrictions imposed on stock 
markets rendered them unattractive sources of industrial finance relative to bank credit 
(Vitols, 2001). So in 1996, around the time of the first election following the electoral 
changes, banking system assets represented around 64 per cent of financial system assets 
(ibid). By way of comparison, the equivalent figure for the US was 25 per cent. Following 
the changes, the costs of providing regulatory favours to organised interests is likely to 
have increased for politicians, while at the same time, reducing the potential benefits to 
collective action. Thus, one might expect the regulation of finance in Japan to move the 
costs of promoting system stability away from consumers of financial services, and onto 
the financial sector – a move from a ‘profit-padding’ style system towards a ‘prudential’ 
style system. However, authors like Hall (2003) and Bebenroth et al (2009) suggest that, 
although it is true that supervisory authorities have been granted more power since the 
mid-1990s, many of the changes deal with the resolution process for failed banks, and that 
the banking system in Japan remains heavily dependent on the provision of public funds.  
 
So while there may be convincing theoretical reasons to suppose that whether an electoral 
systems is centrifugal or centripetal can determine the type of financial regulatory regime, 
the evidence appears mixed, suggesting that the effects may be more indirect. It may rather 
be that the type of electoral system supports a particular constellation of institutional 
spheres, and the financial system forms but one part of this configuration of 
complementary coordinating institutions.  
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4.1.2 Legal Systems and Financial Regulatory Regimes 
In addition to electoral rules, a nation’s legal system and legal institutional heritage are 
another set of fundamental constitutional-level rules which agents may potentially take as 
given when producing strategies in financial-institutional games. Accordingly, the ‘legal 
origins’ literature focuses a great deal of attention on the effects inherited legal systems 
have on financial structures.12 Seminal research in this field was conducted by López de 
Silanes, La Porta, Shleifer & Vishny (1998), where the researchers examined the legal 
rights of corporate shareholders and creditors, as well as their enforcement across 
countries. They classify the 49 countries in their dataset as being of four broad legal 
origins; namely, English common law, French civil law, German civil law and 
Scandinavian civil law. Based on a set of variables measuring the degree of protection for 
investors, the authors then find that countries whose legal rules originate in the common 
law tradition are more likely to provide greater regulatory protection for investors when 
compared to those of a civil law origin, especially the French civil law tradition. This 
suggests again that Anglo-sphere economies tend to exhibit regulation that supports 
markets-based finance. However, despite the statistical correlations cited in this and other 
papers, there has been relatively little success in identifying and demonstrating empirically 
a clear mechanism through which legal origins play a significant role.  
 
Two main hypotheses exist as to the connection; namely the ‘political’ channel and the 
‘adaptability’ channel (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2002). The political channel 
posits that legal traditions differ in terms of the priority they attach to private property 
rights and private contracting, based on the idea that the English common law developed in 
order to protect private property owners against the crown. This is then said to influence 
the extent to which the state can control the judiciary. However, as argued by Graff (2008) 
there does not appear to be a legitimate reason why having judges adhere to strict legal 
codes inhibits the function of private contracting and property rights per se, should they be 
the laws that are laid down in a civil law jurisdiction. The ‘adaptability’ explanation 
suggests that legal origins differ in the extent to which they allow the law to keep pace 
with the changing nature of property rights and private contracting, which is integral for 
allowing rapid changes in financial system structure to take place. This view is supported 
in the comparative legal literature in general; however, it is open to question why, in the 
case of finance in particular, the inertia in law is greater.  Given the continued elusiveness 
of a clear economic channel through which legal origins can have a pronounced effect in 
financial regimes, it may be logical to consider cultural and social heritage, rather than a 
formal legal heritage. As will be seen in Chapter 6, it may be useful to consider a ‘common 
cause’ social explanation for the difference. Countries in the common law tradition may 
carry with them through time a cultural and social heritage incorporating informal norms 
and beliefs about the legitimacy of financial practices. Thus while legal origin may be 
statistically correlated with existing financial regime characteristics, the causal relationship 
is yet to be proven.       
 
                                                 
12
 For examples, see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine (2002) or La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & 
Shleifer, A. (2008). 
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4.2 Endogenous Synchronic Financial Regulatory Institutions 
The previous section described how there is moderate-to-limited evidence to suggest that 
the institutions that agents in the financial regulatory sphere are likely to take as given have 
a direct discernible effect on the type of regime adopted by an economy. As such, the next 
step is to look at what type of institutions in other settings may endogenously provide 
complementarities to those in the financial sphere. Within the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
literature it is commonly suggested that, in the same way that a dichotomy can be made 
between CMEs and LMEs in a range of spheres of economic activity, different modes of 
regulation in the financial system also form part of this distinction. In LMEs the ability to 
access new capital for funding projects depends heavily on the regulation of publicly 
assessable financial information. Regulations support a tendency towards dispersed 
corporate ownership, there are few restrictions of large managerial incentives linked to 
market price signals, and there is a fluid market for corporate control that allows hostile 
takeovers. In CMEs access to new capital depends more heavily on reputation and the 
exchange of private information, they are often characterised by concentrated and cross-
corporate ownership, regulation partially restricts extensive public trading and there is 
heavier reliance on bank-loan finance. From this characterisation, is seems logical that 
financial regulation can enter into institutional game structures via the nexus between 
corporate finance and corporate governance. 
 
 
4.2.1 Corporate governance and Financial Regulatory Regimes 
The conventional approach to understanding modes of corporate governance can be 
broadly traced back to work in the 1930s by Berle and Means, who highlighted the 
significance of the separation of ownership and control in corporate behaviour, and the 
difficulties that arise in terms of managerial incentives (Berle and Means, 1968). The 
problems are generally described in an asymmetric information framework, in particular 
moral hazard. Furthermore, many argue that the manner in which owners of firms attempt 
to overcome these problems and to exert control over management provides a highly 
distinctive difference in modes of both work organisation and corporate finance. For 
example, Roe (2003) describes an Anglo-American model where management behaviour is 
supervised via a board elected by, generally diffuse, external shareholders. The regulatory 
institutions that have developed to support the capability for owners to exert control in this 
environment include bans on insider trading and anti-monopoly rules. But perhaps most 
importantly, regulatory institutions have developed to support an open and fluid market for 
corporate control, based on financial disclosure and open information. The claims of 
employees, customers and suppliers are entirely subordinated to shareholder rights. This 
model contrasts with a coordinated-market model, where management behaviour is 
supervised through ‘insider’ relationships between concentrated ownership blockholders, 
coordination among producers is allowed and a variety of stakeholder claims on the firm 
beyond those of shareholders is accepted. The emphasis here is more on reputation rather 
than information, and the regulatory institutions have developed to allow reputations to be 
fostered and the monitoring costs for large financiers like banks to be reduced or 
minimised.  
Betts: The Politics and Economics of Financial Regulation 
 
30 
 
An illustration of this difference in financing relationship, using the UK and Germany and 
an example is provided by Lütz, S., Eberle, D. & Lauter D. (2011). They describe how the 
relatively recent development of corporate governance codes in these nations represents 
another layer of institutional complementarity in the ‘varieties of capitalism’ framework. In 
the case of the UK ‘outsider’ system, the financing relationship can be characterised as a 
power game between investors and managers, where market-based mechanisms of 
monitoring and disciplining management, such as the hostile takeover market, serve to 
direct corporate strategy towards maximising shareholder value. Even though investors 
generally stay at ‘arms- length’ from the companies they invest in, management are acutely 
cautious of poor share price performance, as it seriously jeopardises their job security. In 
the case of the German insider system, companies are embedded in a much broader set of 
relationships. In particular, the heavier reliance on intermediated finance means that banks 
play a larger role in influencing corporate strategy. Furthermore, industry and labour 
associations are enabled by government regulation to have a negotiating position with 
regard to internal decision-making. Management discipline and monitoring is based on 
long term relationships formed with stakeholder coalitions, including banks, large 
shareholders and employee representatives. 
 
Taking a more general approach, Amable (2003) presents a simple model that makes a 
specific link between corporate finance, corporate governance and skills and training 
institutions. The choice in this case is between two types for each institutional sphere. In 
the financial system the choice is between a ‘decentralised’ system where financial markets 
play a prominent role, and a ‘centralised’ system where banks are the main source of 
external finance. In the skills and training system, the choice is between a focus on general 
transferable skills that are non-specific to particular firms, and a focus on specialised skills 
that are firm-specific. Based on the assumption that financial markets-based systems 
favour short-term investment projects, Amable (2003) suggests that two of the four 
possible combinations of institutions will emerge. One will favour short-term strategies in 
both the relationship between the firm and its external financiers, as well as the firm and its 
employees. This uncertainty over employment tenure then leads employees to invest in 
transferable skills. The second viable combination is based on long-term strategies for the 
firm, its financiers and its employees. Here, ‘patient capital’ provided by banks is said to 
allow longer employment tenures, which encourages employees to invest in firm-specific 
skills.    
 
 
4.2.2 Labour Relations and Financial Regulatory Regimes 
Adopting a similar ‘time-constraint’ explanation, the way in which the character of 
coordination in the corporate governance sphere can be linked to that in labour relations is 
outlined by Hall and Gingerich (2004). In their framework, the relative strength of 
minority owners within firms provided by regulatory protections, and the dispersion of 
control across firms will create differing levels of control in the hands of firm 
management.  This control manifests itself as both limits on the potential for hostile 
takeovers, as well as the ability to raise capital based on reputation and networking. 
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According to this framework, both these effects alter the focus of management on current 
profitability. In the case where firms rely on equity-based financing and management 
operates under the threat of removal should the share price fall, there is likely to be a 
greater focus on maintaining short-term profitability. This institutional setting reinforces, 
and is reinforced by, those institutions in the labour market that also allow for competitive 
wage setting and high staff turnover. This arises because the greater flexibility afforded to 
managers in terms of employee numbers allows them to respond to fluctuations in 
economic conditions. In the CME case, relationship-based bank finance and a low threat of 
hostile takeovers means that firms do not face the same incentives to maintain current 
profitability when output fluctuates, meaning they are able to make credible longer-term 
commitments to their employees regarding wages and job security. Industrial relations 
between firms and trade unions, therefore, tend to be less conflict-based. 
 
A formalised version of this model of institutional complementarity between the industrial 
relations and financial spheres is proposed by Amable, Ernst & Palombarini (2005). The 
model similarly highlights the link between time-based constraints arising out of the way 
firms are financed, and the types of strategies employed during wage bargaining between 
firms and trade unions. In this model, trade unions and firms can either undertake 
cooperative negotiations, which are assumed to represent a long-term investment in the 
performance of the firm; or, to pursue conflict-based negotiations, in which the aim is to 
maximise the current share of income. Each period, it is assumed that there is some 
probability that outside investors will withdraw financing, leading to the liquidation of the 
firm. The likelihood that this happens is determined by two elements: current profitability 
and the extent to which union and management have pursued cooperative strategies. The 
relative weighting of these two elements depends on what Amable, Ernst & Palombarini 
(2005) refer to as the external, non-stakeholder, influence on the firm. When financial 
investors have a high influence over the strategy of the firm because of arm’s length 
financial markets, the survival probability of the firm is increased when short-term profits 
are high. On the other hand, when financial investors have only a negligible influence 
because of bank-based finance, survival probability is increased when the degree of 
cooperation between firm and union is high. So given this framework, when firms and 
unions maximise, the strategies chosen are found to depend on the outside-influence 
parameter. When this is above a particular defined threshold, both firms and unions choose 
short-term strategies. This is consistent with institutions in the labour market being 
characterised by high labour turnover, and de-centralised wage bargaining, which in turn 
has consequences for skill acquisition and training. Conversely, when this outside 
influence parameter is below a defined threshold, both firm and union choose long-term 
strategies, consistent with longer job tenure, more centralised wage bargaining and a less 
conflict-based relationship between employers and employees, thus allowing job-specific 
skill acquisition.  
 
The intuitive appeal of financing constraints affecting the time-based incentives of firm 
management, and in turn influencing its coordination strategies is clear. However, the 
approach of Hall and Gingerich (2004) is somewhat vague, and does not pay a great deal 
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of attention is to the exact mechanism in the financial relationship nexus that gives rise to 
their effects. Amable, Ernst & Palombarini (2005), on the other hand, appear to rely 
extremely heavily on the assumption that market-based finance necessarily produces an 
over-riding and pervasive management focus on maximising short-term profitability. This 
may be true, but it nevertheless forms both an assumption and outcome of their model, 
rendering in need of scrutiny. Their model is also highly suppositious, in that many of the 
assumptions about the nature of the relationships are seemingly unrealistic.  
 
 
4.3 A ‘Hirschmanian’ Model of Corporate Finance 
The literature outlined in the previous section emphasises the link between the nature of a 
firm’s financing relationship and its style of management. Generally this is said to come 
about through the effect of the financing constraint on managerial time horizon. This is a 
plausible explanation, but lacks a precisely articulated mechanism. Furthermore, it says 
little about financial regulation. Therefore, I propose an alternative perspective on the way 
in which corporate finance and capital structure is related to the power of financial 
stakeholders provided by a regulatory regime. It proposes an explicit mechanism by which 
different financial regulatory regimes generate varying institutional complementarities. It is 
a mechanism that embodies the nexus between corporate finance and corporate 
governance, specifically focussing on the difference between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ 
systems, and how this relates to bank-versus markets-based financial regulation. 
 
 
4.3.1 The Institutional Game Structure and Equilibrium 
The difference between an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ mode of corporate control stems 
from how ‘control rights’ are perceived by investors, and how this (perception?) differs 
depending on the relative diffusion of ownership. In economics, property rights over 
ownership of an economic asset are said to confer a bundle of rights, including the right to 
derive utility or income from an asset, the right to control the use of the asset and the right 
to transfer ownership of the good to others (Demsetz, 1967). In the case of claims to the 
control and profits of firms, property rights can be characterised in the same broad terms. 
Investors of all classes (equity holders, bank lenders, bond holders, etc.) have particular 
types of rights to controlling the use and to the income of a firm. In the case of equity 
holders, control rights are paramount, but income is less clearly defined. On the other hand, 
for bondholders, income rights are clearly defined by fixed interest rates, but control over 
the firm is limited. Broadly speaking the degree of rights on one dimension is traded off 
against the degree of rights in the other. The key distinction between an ‘insider’ and an 
‘outsider’ system appears when we examine how investors exercise their control rights. I 
suggest that the ‘exit versus voice’ framework of Hirschman (1970) can be used to 
understand the difference in the character of corporate finance in ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ 
systems. Hirschman suggests that when agents are dissatisfied with the operation of an 
organisation of which they are members, they can express their disapproval either by 
exiting the organisation, and thus forgoing the benefits it provides, or by remaining with 
the organisation and attempting to instigate change by voicing their discontent. Both 
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avenues can be effective forms of motivation enabling organisational leaders to be 
responsive to decreases in quality or benefit for members, but are likely to provide 
different kinds of incentives. This distinction between ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ has strong 
parallels to the choice of coordination, be it market versus non-market. The classical 
conception of a market is based purely on the notion of ‘exit’. In a world of perfect 
competition, decisions about whether or not to purchase a particular good at a particular 
price is the equivalent of an ‘exit’ strategy. In the Walrasian-Hayekian tradition, these 
price signals based on the ‘exit’ feedback mechanism are all that is required for sellers to 
make economic decisions. On the other hand, ‘voice’ is more concerned with a more 
qualitative feedback mechanism, that relies on cues other than market signals to prompt 
change.  
 
This type of distinction can also be made in the area of corporate control. In a diffuse 
shareholder, or ‘outsider’ system, for any individual, the control rights associated with the 
ownership of an economic asset are effectively zero, since the probability of any one 
shareholder being decisive in any board election decision is very small. This is similar to 
the ‘paradox of voting’ outlined by Downs (1957) whereby voters in political elections 
have a very small chance of playing a pivotal role in determining the result, when 
compared to the marginal expected private benefits of their most preferred outcome. 
However, unlike the Downsian case where voting may reflect other factors, like the 
expression of ethical or ideological principles (Brennan and Lomasky, 1997), there does 
not seem to be a strong case to suggest that investors perceive the same kinds of expressive 
benefits in the boardroom. Therefore, instead of exercising the control rights associated 
with an economic asset, if an investor in a diffuse shareholder regime is dissatisfied with 
the asset over whose use they have control, they will simply choose the exit option, and 
sell their share on liquid and deep financial markets. Thus when the performance of 
management in a corporation deteriorates, financial investors look to better investment 
opportunities elsewhere, firstly because their affective ability to affect change is limited, 
and secondly due to their ability to switch to a plethora of alternative investments, while 
incurring minimal transaction costs. This perhaps explains why ‘outsider’ financial 
regulatory regimes are characterised by both high levels of information disclosure and 
managerial incentives tightly linked to the most salient indicator of investor entry and exit 
– the share price. Given the diffuse nature of ownership, personal reputation and 
relationships are not viable, so firms must rely on financial disclosure to signal quality.  
 
In contrast, an ‘insider’ system characterised by concentrated ownership and with finance 
provided by large financial blockholders like banks, the exercise of the control rights over 
corporate assets, or “voicing” grievances, is much more effective. Furthermore, with fewer 
publicly listed companies, and limited corporate debt markets, ‘exit’ is often a difficult or 
expensive option for investors in ‘insider’ systems. Therefore, ‘insider’ systems are 
characterised by financial regulatory policies which discourage an active market for 
corporate control, and do not use financial disclosure and price signals as an indicator of 
corporate quality. 
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Conceptualised in the game-theoretic framework described in Chapter 3, this can be 
represented as a game between investors and owners of firms. Investors face the choice of 
either exercising their property right to sell (exit) or control (voice). Their choice will be 
affected by firstly the perceived value in exerting control but also by the transactions costs 
associated with selling their financial claim. Owners, on the other hand, must choose a 
method by which to overcome the principle-agent problem and thereby incentivise and 
monitor the behaviour of managers. They may choose to either link manager remuneration 
to the performance of the share price, or to directly monitor and provide long-term 
incentives. Stock-based incentives will be most effective when good performance of the 
firm is readily and accurately reflected in the share price.  Crucially, the game structure 
and associated payoffs will be to a large extent determined by the financial regulatory 
regime in place. Specifically, whether it promotes information disclosure and fluid 
financial markets with low transaction costs, or alternatively privileges blockholding and 
limits free financial market activities. For illustrative purposes, a formal version of this 
model is provided in APPENDIX A.  
 
By way of example, FIGURE 6 shows a normal form version of this game assuming two 
different regulatory regimes. The payoffs are based on the model described in the 
APPENDIX, and uses parameter values that have been set for illustrative purposes, but are 
nonetheless plausible.13 In regulatory regime A, an equilibrium corresponds to the 
combination of exit for investors and the application of stock-based incentives by owners. 
In the case of regulatory regime B, there is again one equilibrium, but it corresponds to the 
combination of voice for investors and direct monitoring for owners.  
 
 
From this model, two general propositions can be stated.  
                                                 
13
 In ‘Regulatory regime A’, transaction costs are assumed to be zero because of the high liquidity of 
financial markets: 
 = 0. Diffuse ownership also causes the probability that an investor will be decisive to 
approach zero:  → 0. In ‘Regulatory regime B’, transaction costs are assumed to be high, 
 = , and the 
probability of decisiveness higher because of blockholding:  =  .For both regimes, the other parameter 
values are constant:  =  ,  = 8  
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i) The combination of direct monitoring and voice represents an ‘insider’ governance 
system, while the combination of share-price-based incentives and exit represents and 
‘outsider’ governance system.  
ii) The type of financial regulatory regime (markets-orientated versus bank-orientated) 
affects game structure in meaningful ways and acts to support and re-enforce the 
institutional equilibrium selection of either an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’ system.  
 
 
4.3.2 Institutional Complementarities  
FIGURE 7 shows the corporate governance-corporate finance nexus described above in an 
institutional matrix representation (Amable, Ernst & Palombarini, 2005), and contains the 
payoffs associated with institutional choice across it, and another sphere; namely, financial 
regulation.   
 
 
 
 
It is clear in this example, that the systemic combinations of ‘insider plus blockholder’, and 
‘outsider plus shareholder’ are both complementary according to the definition of ‘strong 
complementarity’ defined in section 3.2.14 In other words, once established, any deviation 
in institutional form, while holding the other forms constant, reduces the payoff for at least 
one of the players. 
 
Importantly however, complementarity also enters into this exit-voice framework, because 
the prevalence of either ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ strategies for investors is not neutral with respect 
to its impact on the firm in terms of the incentives for managers. This understanding of the 
difference between ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ in the realm of corporate finance fits well with the 
overall understanding of complementarities between corporate governance regimes and 
                                                 
14
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other spheres in the economy.  Even in a de jure sense, basic property rights regarding the 
benefits, use and disposal of corporate assets are similar across jurisdictions, different 
regulatory institutions and institutional complementarities will produce varying de facto 
behaviour of investors. Hirschman (1970) describes how, in the case of a firm’s customers, 
those who are the most active and reliable observers of the quality of a product are also 
those who are able to exercise their exit option most quickly. However, a rapid exodus of 
this type also deprives the firm of the feedback voice of those most suitable to provide it, 
since those who are left in control once the deterioration is demonstrated through others 
exiting, were not astute enough to discover it in the first place.  The same might be said for 
the market for corporate control. The implication is that systems reliant on exit tend to be 
more susceptible to rapid changes in quality and unexpected drastic changes in modes of 
organisation. As argued in the comparative capitalism literature described above, this 
encourages firms, owners of capital and workers to invest in switchable assets. In contrast, 
systems where the financial regulatory regime supports the exercise of voice strategies by 
investors, provide a more qualitative feedback mechanism. The effectiveness of this 
system relies on the ability for a long-term relationship to develop between capital and 
management, and between the firm and its stakeholders. The credible formation of these 
long-term commitments allows owners of capital, managers and workers to invest in 
specific assets.  
 
 
5. The Political Economic Diachronic Process and Financial Regulatory 
Institutions  
With the exogenous institutions and endogenous equilibrium strategies representing 
financial regulatory institutions conceptualised as above, the question then arises 
concerning the type of meta-institutional upper-tier diachronic processes that influence this 
lower-tier game structure? Why are the games structured in the way they are, and how do 
agents form their perceptions of these games and the associated payoffs? As described in 
general terms in Section 3.3, changes can firstly occur when agents attempt to affect 
change in the formal institutional architecture as an expression of collective action in the 
‘political market’. Often seen in terms of changes in bargaining power, it also hinges 
significantly on capabilities in overcoming free-rider situations.  
 
There are particular reasons why private interests may be more likely to intrude into 
policy-making, which are especially potent when it comes to the financial sector. Firstly, it 
may provide non-transparent off-budget redistribution since the type of rents procured 
from regulatory manipulation in the financial sector can be far more opaque for the average 
citizen, especially when compared to other types of redistribution, via direct taxes and 
transfers, for example. Secondly, unlike other areas where there is a general consensus as 
to how regulation should be applied, one of the main reasons for private interests to 
influence policy-making in the financial sector is that there is still a great deal of ambiguity 
regarding the best approach (Cunningham & Zaring, 2009).  There really exists no single 
definitive blueprint for designing banking and financial rules, let alone a clear notion of 
what constitutes an appropriate role for financial markets. For this reason, choosing one 
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mode of regulation over another may be considered more a question of judgement rather 
than strict calculations regarding economic efficiency. As such, there are clear, yet 
indecisive trade-offs involved that favour certain groups of domestic constituents over 
others.  This policy-making becomes highly susceptible to distributive political concerns 
and thus a political calculus, rather than an economic one.      
 
Therefore, when attempting to understand the determinants and origins of financial 
regulatory regimes, it is crucial to be able to untangle the complex web of competing 
interests and objectives of the various groups within a society. This involves elucidating 
and defining the various preferences, benefits, costs and incentives for the different groups 
involved – traditional banks, political parties, bureaucrats, non-financial firms, 
international organisations etc. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, examines specific 
cases of organised interests that may look to gain substantially from influencing financial 
regulatory legislation. It represents the diachronic process by which their ability to acquire 
resources by overcoming free-rider dilemmas, based on their concentration and the 
intensity of their preferences, may produce new equilibria within the lower-tier 
institutional game structure.  
 
 
5.1 The Traditional Banking Sector 
Deposit-taking financial intermediaries like traditional banks have historically been treated 
as unique and critical objects of state regulation, both because the nature of their business 
involves significantly competing interests, and because the consequences of bankruptcies 
are different to those in conventional product markets. These problems of financial 
intermediation that regulation attempts to address can be broken down into two main 
classes – issues of solvency and issues of liquidity. Issues of solvency arise because at any 
point in time, the owners of a bank are only liable to depositors for a fraction of what has 
been deposited. Should asset values decline sufficiently, for reasons like write-downs from 
bad loans, there then would be insufficient money left to fully repay depositors. Thus, 
capital provides a buffer for depositors against adverse movements in asset prices and bad 
loans, but the higher the leverage; the less asset prices need to fall before a firm becomes 
insolvent. However, the revenue received by financial firms tends to also increase with the 
degree of leverage, so there is always an incentive for financial firms to expand balance 
sheets and reduce the relative size of capital. Therefore, the balancing act that financial 
firms perform is ultimately a trade-off between higher profitability and lower risk of 
insolvency. Issues of liquidity refers to the fact that, when financial intermediaries perform 
their function of capital re-allocation, it generally (although not necessarily) involves a 
significant degree of maturity transformation. This occurs when long-term loans (assets) 
are provided using short-term deposits (liabilities) and made attractive because, short-term 
securities attract lower interest owing largely to the flexibility allowed. However, this also 
means that if a firm has made too many bad loans, or even if depositors merely suspect that 
this is the case, a sudden rush to withdraw money cannot be met, as money is tied up in 
long-term assets. Therefore, even if a firm is solvent in a technical sense, given that 
maturity transformation does not work in reverse, a bank would be unable to meet its 
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financial obligations. As with issues of solvency, there is a strong incentive for banks to 
fund themselves as short-term as possible, while holding assets with as long-term maturity 
as possible, which again leads to a trade-off between high profitability and short-term 
liquidity/stability.  
 
These incentives for risk-taking by managers of financial institutions form the key schism 
between different economic interests, which a large part of financial regulation attempts to 
address. In most jurisdictions there exists some form of regulation that attempts to restrain 
the risk-taking behaviour of bank managers. However, banks as a group may not 
necessarily oppose some supervisory oversight and prudential restrictions. There is a 
tension for the financial industry in terms of the tightness of supervisory rules, as on the 
one hand, financial firms are likely to have a ‘preference for laxity’ (Heinemann & 
Schüler, 2003), because regulation generally entails limiting individual bank’s risk 
exposure and ostensibly restricting profitability. Therefore, we might expect that in 
systems where financial markets are the dominant source of finance for firms, banks are 
likely to attempt to collectively organise to push for less stringent restrictions in order to 
better compete with both capital market and shadow-banking institutions. 
 
However, financial intermediaries may also favour strict supervision and strong 
requirements so as to create costly ‘barriers to entry’ (ibid) for new firms (both domestic 
and foreign). Competition is thereby limited in the sector, and the privileged position of 
banks in providing corporate finance maintained.15 There is a further reason why banks 
may push for increased regulatory measures, which, at least to the appearance of 
depositors, increase their financial soundness. Banks have an incentive to maintain the 
perception that they are safe places for savers to deposit funds, which has the direct effect 
of reducing their funding costs. The safer a bank is perceived, the lower its borrowing 
costs. When banks appear to operate within a system of supervision and regulation, their 
funding costs may be lower, even if their fundamental safety is questionable. We need only 
look to the recent financial crisis to see that risk was extraordinarily mispriced by 
depositors in some of the world’s largest banks and it is likely that the fact that most 
jurisdictions were operating under the Basel requirement led to this false perception.  
 
But how can we determine whether the financial sector will favour a regulatory system that 
relies on markets and information disclosure or a more stringent system that creates 
barriers to entry? Rajan and Zingales (2001) present a model that make a distinction 
between what they term ‘sophisticated’ and ‘unsophisticated’ financial regimes, which 
roughly corresponds to the distinction made in Chapter 1 between ‘prudential’ style and 
‘profit-padding’ regulation respectively. So-called sophisticated regimes are characterised 
by elements such as a transparent accounting and disclosure system; a legal system that 
cheaply enforces financial contracts; and the promotion of competition in finance. On the 
                                                 
15
 Heinemann & Schüler (2003), set out to empirically test their hypothesis; however their empirical study 
suffers from some methodological issues, like limitations in data availability and poor operationalisation of 
variables. For example, the authors use the total budget for prudential supervision as their main measure of 
the strictness of financial regulation, however this pre-supposes a prudential/supervisory regulatory regimes 
and ignores a range of other modes of financial regulation. 
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other hand, a so-called unsophisticated regime is viewed as one where financing is largely 
relationship-based, and in the absence of disclosure and low-cost contract enforcement, 
financiers use connections to monitor loans and obtain information about firms. 
Furthermore, for non-financial incumbents in a relationship-based system, long-term 
reputations and the ability to provide collateral, and well as the ability to finance projects 
out of retained earnings are crucial. Therefore, for both financial and non-financial 
incumbent firms in such a system, there may be significant resistance to market-finance. 
This arises because incumbent financiers may be wary of arms-length markets, as they 
could give promote greater competition and reduce the informational rents that are 
available in the absence of disclosure and contract enforcement. Non-financial incumbents 
may in some circumstances also be opposed to greater disclosure rules and fluid 
contracting, because they can reduce the relative importance of an incumbent industrial 
firm’s collateral, retained earnings and reputation, thus allowing newcomers to enter 
markets and breed competition with new industrial entrants. Notwithstanding the clearly 
implicit value judgement made by Rajan and Zingales with regard to their classification of 
financial systems (as described earlier, non-markets-based modes of corporate finance can 
produce complementarities with other spheres of coordination in the economy), it is 
nonetheless plausible that both established banks and incumbent non-financial firms may 
have a significant interest in financial regulation that maintains their ‘insider’ status in 
financial relationships. However, this may not always be the case. For Rajan & Zingales 
(2001) the key determinant of whether non-financial incumbents will support ‘insider’ 
finance will be the degree to which the economy is open to capital and trade flows. When 
non-financial incumbents are able to access relatively cheap finance from overseas 
financial firms, the benefits of this cheap finance may be greater than those rents arising 
out of the limited competition in product markets caused by relationship-based finance. 
This effect will be made even stronger when an economy is open to trade, since foreign 
competition is likely to compete away those domestic rents, so the benefits to incumbent 
non-financial firms of attempting to limit new entrants through reducing their access to 
finance will be significantly reduced.     
 
Deposit insurance is another financial regulatory measure that has been implemented 
virtually uniformly across advanced economies justified by a consumer protection and 
system stability rationale.  However, it may also be strongly in the interest of banks to 
lobby for such a scheme, especially when it is publicly funded. Explicit deposit insurance 
has spread rapidly in recent years. Indeed, the number of countries offering explicit deposit 
insurance guarantees almost tripled during the last quarter of the 20th century, rising from 
12 in 1974 to 71 in 1999 (Demirgüç-Kunt & Kane, 2002). Vitally, the effect of this type of 
regulation is to significantly lower the rate of interest banks must pay on deposits because 
they are guaranteed to be honoured, generally through the provision of public funds. But it 
is also often true, that this may create significant moral hazard. This arises because banks 
are no longer constrained by the scrutiny of wary depositors and are provided with an 
incentive to make riskier investments. As they capture all the upside, but have the 
downside limited by insurance, banks as well as consumers will generally be in favour of 
these measures, that is, until taxpayer money is actually required to bail out a failed bank. 
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Furthermore, even in the case where the financial sector itself is required to internally fund 
the insurance scheme via mandatory insurance premiums, moral hazard can still arise. 
Individual insurance premiums are generally not tailored to each bank’s risk profile, so 
there is an incentive for any individual bank to lend recklessly when insurance premiums 
are not linked to risk. Indeed, a study by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) finds that 
in a sample of 61 countries, and spanning the years between 1980 and 1997, explicit 
deposit insurance is associated with a higher likelihood of banking crises. The effect is 
found to be stronger when bank interest rates are deregulated and the coverage offered to 
depositors is more extensive. 
 
Virtually all advanced economies have some type of legislated deposit insurance scheme, 
so it seems clear that this alignment of interests between consumers and the banking 
industry forms a strong underlying demand for this type of financial regulatory institution. 
It seems that the consumer protection motif expounded in public discourse, combined with 
the pressure applied by banking lobby groups, creates an unlikely coalition, and one 
politicians are unlikely to be able to resist, even when the ultimate consequences for 
system stability may be detrimental.  
 
 
5.2 Shadow Banking, Hedge Funds and Non-bank financial intermediaries 
Beginning roughly in the 1980s, a new type of financial firm began to emerge, which to a 
large extent mirrors the intermediation function performed by traditional banks (Froud, 
Leaver & Williams, 2007). The business model of this new type of financial firm relies on 
much the same maturity and risk transformation function as traditional banks, except for 
one important difference. This business model relies on dealing in more complex market-
orientated financial instruments than traditional loans and deposits, such that both the 
assets and liabilities of these firms are almost exclusively traded on financial markets. 
Often referred to as ‘shadow banking’, as it tends to fall out of nations’ banking regulatory 
nets, it is perhaps better described as ‘market-banking’. The relatively recent ascent (and 
decline) of this industry in many parts of the world, especially the Anglo-sphere 
economies, provides and interesting case for examining financial regulation. 
 
Much of the limited literature studying the regulation of hedge funds and non-bank 
intermediaries focuses on the international political economy of regulation with regard to 
inter-governmental agencies like the BIS, or the EU.16 These studies argue that the 
regulatory regime pressed for by individual states on the international stage is directly 
linked to the relative size of their hedge fund industries. However, these studies tend to 
abstract significantly from the domestic political economic factors that act to determine 
state preferences regarding hedge fund regulation. There is evidence to suggest that this 
‘industry size’ explanation may be too simplistic. For example, Fioretos (2010) describes 
how, even though the Hedge fund industry in France is nearly twenty times larger than that 
in Germany, France has tended to be more aggressive in supporting tighter regulation. In 
                                                 
16
 For examples, see Quaglia, 2011; Porter, 2002; Kamal, 2012. 
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reality, there are many stakeholders in the effects of non-bank financial regulatory policy at 
the domestic level that go beyond the industry itself, including traditional banks, brokers 
and dealers, retail investors and private investors. 
 
One of the defining characteristics of this new class of financial institution, aside from the 
fact that both their assets and liabilities tend to be traded on financial markets, is that both 
their customers and financiers tend to be other financial corporations. This is very unlike 
the traditional model of banking, where intermediation involves the channelling of 
household deposits to non-financial firms for the purpose of investment. In the place of 
household deposits there are short-term debt securities issued to large investors, like 
pension funds. In the place of loans to non-financial firms, there are securitised loan 
products issued by investment banks and retail banks. In addition, around these non-bank 
intermediaries, a range of financial service firms have come into existence, whose role is to 
provide information and brokerage services, along with insurance providers, who issue 
derivative-type securities, and ratings agencies who sell ratings. Importantly as well, due to 
its iterative and obfuscatory nature, the risk of these firms has the potential to be grossly 
mispriced, and is sufficiently detached from the voter that many failed to see the consumer 
protection and systemic safety rationale for its regulation. Furthermore, by its very nature, 
this intermediation model can provide significant incentives for a large coalition of 
interests to maintain its presence. For example, prior to the GFC, in economies like the US 
and UK where this model of ‘market-banking’ was prevalent, borrowing was cheap due to 
the apparent benefits of loan-pooling and securitisation. Therefore, non-financial firms and 
households alike enjoyed the benefits of cheap credit, allowing the continued smoothing of 
investment for the former, and of consumption for the latter – representing the 
expansionary phase in the Minsky financial instability hypothesis (see above). Politicians 
were also more than willing to allow this to continue, with voters in these economies 
satisfied with their perceived growth in wealth and prosperity through increases in asset 
prices across most classes, but particularly in the housing market. For example, 
Montgomerie (2009) suggests that during the years leading up to the GFC, access to asset-
backed credit temporarily forestalled the stagnation in growth of living standards for the 
middle class in the United States. Broadly speaking, in such an environment, there are 
unlikely to be many groups who have either the incentives or the collective action 
capabilities to attempt to instigate regulatory reform. The most obvious group who may 
have had an incentive to curtail this model were ordinary constituents without large asset 
portfolios, whose relative wealth was declining significantly. However, this group clearly 
faced the same type of collective action dilemma as dispersed consumer interests in 
general, and furthermore, tended to be concentrated in younger and lower income 
demographics. 
 
The GFC, however, caused an acute moment of Downsian “alarmed discovery” (Downs, 
1972, pp. 39-40), representing the point when, as a result of some dramatic series of 
events, the public suddenly becomes cognisant of and alarmed by a particular political 
issue. Contrary to the prior assurances of many financial market participants, increasing 
defaults on loans led to sharp declines in the value of securitised debt assets on global 
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financial markets. As a result, some of the funds holding these assets became insolvent, 
while others experienced an extremely sharp increase in funding costs, leading to liquidity 
problems (otherwise known as a credit crunch). Furthermore, the more traditional investors 
like pension funds and mutual funds, who had been lured into investing in these defunct 
funds, now faced significant loses, and moved to call on the insurance they had purchased 
to protect against such an eventuality. Unfortunately, the insurance companies who had 
provided these assurances could no longer honour them. This chain of insolvencies and 
illiquidity soon spread to the non-financial sector, where assets values declined 
significantly across most classes, investment and consumption dried up, and a global 
recession resulted. The issue became so pronounced to voters and politicians alike that the 
broad coalition of interests, which had supported weak regulation of these non-bank 
intermediaries, crumbled.  
 
The analysis of the interests of organised groups in financial regulatory policy during the 
lead-up to the GFC and the problems they generated, begs the question as to why this new 
mode of ‘market-banking’ and indirect regulation came to be so 'much more prevalent in 
some parts of the world and not others. For example, in much of continental Europe, non-
bank intermediaries form just a small part of the financial sector, with four-fifths of 
Europe’s hedge funds located in the UK. Regulation was also much tighter, with direct 
regulation applied through registration, disclosure and reporting requirements. In Germany, 
the investment techniques and activities employed by hedge funds were even prohibited 
until 2004. This goes some way in explaining the stance of continental European 
governments in international negotiations, but does not explain the origins of this 
approach, and what political economic factors determined the financial institutional path in 
which ‘market- banking’ failed to develop.  
 
One explanation may be that in financial systems where corporate finance more closely 
resembles the ‘insider’ model of corporate finance, with firms maintaining close 
relationships with financiers and monitoring performed via insider networks, traditional 
banks had an interest in preventing the competition engendered by corporations looking to 
engage in market-banking. While traditional banks in these economies may also have an 
interest in moving further towards this potentially highly profitable market-banking model, 
and therefore might seek looser regulatory designs, there may also be disadvantages to 
pursuing this objective. Firstly, the domestic banking industry, being relatively 
inexperienced with this mode of finance may be at a significant disadvantage to foreign 
competitors. Secondly, large investors like pension funds may have been expected to be 
less willing to provide funding to these alternative banking regimes, and instead be more 
risk averse. Finally, pursuing financial regulatory change that allows a greater role for 
‘market-banking’ is likely to significantly undermine the ‘insider’ model.  
 
Another explanation may lie in the relative importance of the financial services sector that 
provides a vast range of support service to the market-based banking model. This broad 
coalition of financial services firms has a significant interest in both increasing the size and 
overall turnover in financial markets, as well as expanding the range of financial securities 
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that are available, to which they can apply their proclaimed expertise. As a result, they 
support minimal financial regulation. Whereas intermediaries may have an interest in some 
regulation providing an image of safety that results in low funding costs, financial services 
firms have no such incentive. One implication of this is that, in economies where securities 
markets already occupy a central role and have thus created a powerful coalition of related 
services firms, there is likely to be a great deal more pressure, both on politicians and 
through public discourse, to limit regulation on hedge funds and ‘market-banking’. 
Accordingly, while securities markets have historically occupied a central role in LMEs 
like the United States and the United Kingdom, they have constituted only a relatively 
small part of the financial system in the CMEs like Germany and France (Coleman, 1996). 
 
A final explanation may lie in the relative strength of homeowners and the importance of 
the mortgage market in different economies. As described earlier, in economies where 
home-ownership is more widespread and where more households have large debts, there is 
likely be significant pressure on politicians to implement policies that reduce borrowing 
rates. FIGURE 8 shows the rates of mortgage debt incidence across a number of countries 
in 2001. There appears to be some correlation between the countries where market-banking 
received weaker regulation during the lead-up to the GFC, and the proportion of 
households with mortgages in 2001. For example, mortgages were more than twice as 
common amongst households in the United States and the United Kingdom than in 
Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
In many cases of collective action failure on the part of dispersed consumers, the effects of 
regulation and the efficiency losses imposed on them are not sufficiently visible to provide 
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an adequate incentive to overcome the free-rider problem. However, the regulation of the 
type of finance that affects housing may be an exception. Both the price of housing and 
changes in mortgage repayments are highly visible, so where the affected group is 
relatively small, moves to regulate loan-pooling and securitisation are likely to be met with 
less resistance. 
 
 
5.3 The Centre-left hypothesis 
An increased direct stake of ordinary consumers in events on financial markets may not be 
limited to housing, and in a vast number of advanced economies, household ownership of a 
range of financial assets is increasing. Partly due to the looming demography-driven crisis 
in public retirement schemes, many researchers refer to this process broadly as ‘the 
privatisation of risk’, whereby services that were previously provided by the state, like 
retirement savings and social insurances, are increasingly being transferred onto the 
balance sheets of households (Burtless, 2000). The proportion of the general public who 
directly own shares has tended to rise in developed countries over recent decades. In the 
US, for example,  the proportion of the population who directly own equity securities 
increased from around 17 per cent to 30 per cent between 1983 and 2005 (Grout et al, 
2009). This often has the effect of significantly altering the underlying incentives for 
political actors, thereby ending the cohesion of many of the political coalitions and creating 
latent demand for formal financial regulatory institutional change. Furthermore, Cioffi, 
J.W. & Höpner M. (2006) argue that partisan politics also plays a significant role in 
creating new pro-shareholder and pro-financial market regulatory reform, and that 
paradoxically, centre-left parties in many countries pushed for these corporate governance 
reforms over the past 15 years. Facing a decline in the traditional working-class 
demographic and the waning appeal of traditional leftist economic policies, the centre-left 
developed an electoral strategy in many countries to appeal to this new class of middle-
class voters, who had direct interests in the promotion of investor protections in financial 
markets. In this way, corporate governance reform was used by the centre-left to also 
undermine the existing relationship between corporate and right-wing elites by generating 
political alliances with newly developed institutional segments of the financial sector. 
 
 
5.4 Leviathan: Governments and Supervisory/Regulatory Bureaucracies 
In addition to the interests of firms and consumers, some authors like Kroszner (2000) 
describe how, beyond the channelling of the public’s demands, the private interests of 
public officials, regulatory bodies and supervisory bureaucracies can also have significant 
influence over financial regulatory policy. For example, when there are close ties between 
government and banks, or when banks are publicly owned, some budget-constrained 
governments may attempt to obtain relatively cheap deficit financing. On the other hand, 
where governments have little influence over banks, there may be an impetus to develop 
liquid securities markets into which governments can more easily and cheaply issue 
sovereign debt. 
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Bank supervisors themselves, or the agencies appointed with the task of regulating the 
financial sector, may also have an incentive to expand their influence and power, in which 
case the industry may become over-regulated. Since regulatory authority is often delegated 
in some way, it may also be in the interests of supervisors and bureaucrats to make 
regulatory rules as complex as possible in order to increase the value of their specialised 
knowledge.     
 
 
6. Socially Constructed Diachronic Processes and Financial Regulation 
“You shall not charge interest on loans to your brother, interest on money, 
interest on food, interest on anything that is lent for interest.” Deuteronomy 
23:19-20 
The world of finance and financial regulation might seem like a relatively barren place to 
find influential social processes at work, but on the contrary, cultural attitudes and social 
meanings are pervasively ascribed to finance. From religious norms to the 14th century 
Italian Medici banking dynasty, to Shakespeare’s Shylock, to Gordon Gekko, social 
attitudes regarding finance have always been complex and discrepant, and are rarely 
established in the value-free realm of neo-classical financial economics. For example, take 
the notion of fiat money itself. Fiat money (money issued by governments, but without 
value in and of itself) functions effectively as a means of exchange and a store of wealth 
only when those who use it believe that it has value. It is a social construction that fiat 
money can be exchanged for something of tangible value in the future, and this is entirely 
reliant on the mutually re-enforcing inter-subjective beliefs of individuals. This is not to 
mention the complex meanings and interpretations that are applied to acquiring, saving, 
lending and spending money. 
 
 
6.1 Legitimacy and Financial Regulatory Regimes 
Informal norms regarding the legitimacy of the behaviour of financial actors is similarly 
prominent.  Across the globe we observe that, even when faced with similar circumstances 
regarding corporate decision-making, the types of activities considered appropriate or 
justifiable in terms of financial relationships and financial behaviour will depend on the 
values of the society in which the firm is embedded. For example, Licht (2004) examines 
the culture-specific values of the owners and managers of firms regarding “what is 
considered right, legitimate or desirable in society”, and compares this to how they make 
corporate financial decisions. In particular, Licht (2004) suggests that different cultures 
value particular traits or characteristics differently, and therefore allocate meaning and 
interpretation in differing ways to areas like individualism, agency and responsibility. For 
instance, empirical studies suggest that American business people were more likely to 
focus in individual responsibility, autonomy and the power of hierarchy, when compared to 
East Asian business people, who tended to be more open to group agency and recognised 
situational and interactional factors and constraints on individual behaviour. This type of 
subjective belief system can be related to the model of corporate control described in 
Betts: The Politics and Economics of Financial Regulation 
 
46 
 
Chapter 4. Here, the differential weight placed on individualism, autonomy and hierarchy 
by agents is likely to significantly affect how investors view hostile takeovers and ‘exit’ 
strategies, and will therefore produce equilibrium strategies and regulatory institutions that 
reflect the degree to which they are relied on as a coordination mechanism in finance. In 
the Anglo-American culture of corporate governance, hostile takeovers in the market for 
corporate control are widely tolerated, suggesting that the legitimacy of these practices is 
not questioned. This type of relationship between cultural values and financial practices is 
tested empirically by Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2004). They examine the 
correlations between national scores on cultural value dimensions and measures of the 
rights of shareholders and creditors. They find that a national culture that promotes 
combative individualistic methods in reconciling conflicting interests and that promotes 
tolerance for the uncertainty this creates, is consistent with using private contracting and 
litigation to deal with economic conflicts. 
 
Seabrooke (2006) takes the argument for the importance socially constructed norms 
regarding legitimacy further, arguing that the way in which governments intervene in order 
to regulate financial markets must be substantially consistent with “conventions on how the 
economy should work,” (ibid p.198). For Seabrooke, financial institutional structures are 
determined in particular, by the changing of conventions amongst non-elite, low-income 
groups, which propagate and ultimately become rigorous economic and social norms. 
Accordingly, interventions by governments to regulate credit issuance, property ownership 
and taxation, as well as to deepen the domestic pool of capital in order to bolster its 
influence in the international financial order, will only be successful to the extent that they 
are consistent with widespread norms. It is these social norms and ideas that provide the 
informal institutional support for the formal financial regulatory architecture.  
 
To illustrate this point, using a multi-tier institutional framework, one can abstractly 
imagine the behaviour of corporate managers, financial firms and financial market 
participants as conforming to some set of strategies or rules, that in equilibrium, allow 
them to coordinate successfully between each other, and with other spheres of economic 
coordination. Underlying these strategies are subjective models that only provide summary 
representations of the strategic environment. As described in 3.2, they therefore need not 
be based on perfect information and consist of a perception of notional payoffs that are a 
function of both material outcomes and an interpretation of those outcomes. Subsequently, 
due to some change in the socially constructed subjective component of their game models, 
possibly localised at first, their equilibrium strategies may start to converge to a new 
‘psychological’ equilibrium. The perceived legitimacy of this new type of behaviour now 
becomes crucial. The informal norms of society at large may disapprove of such 
behaviour, potentially leading to social sanctions being incorporated into the subjective 
game models, and thereby reducing the likelihood of this equilibrium being reached. Or, if 
social sanctioning is insufficient, there may be a drive for formal sanctions to be imposed 
in the form of financial regulations. Importantly, the ability of agents who question the 
legitimacy of the new behaviour to have the informal norm formalised will depend heavily 
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on their relative collective action and dialogical capabilities, as well as formal political 
institutions. 
 
Also crucial, these sanctioning or enabling social processes need not exist on the domestic 
economic level. For example, Abdelal (2007) sees the legitimating power of international 
organisations on the informal norms and ideologies of domestic political elites as crucial to 
understanding aspects of financial regulation. International organisations, such as the 
OECD, IMF, BIS and European Union can have an influence in a ‘legal’ sense, but also in 
a socially constitutive sense. The can heavily influence the social context of financial 
regimes by disseminating meanings to regulatory tools, defining for their members what 
constitutes legitimate financial policies, and by disseminating purported orthodoxy of 
thought. It is also important to acknowledge how the norms espoused by international 
organisations contribute to the social and organisational construction of signals that are 
interpreted by financial actors themselves. For example, the BIS and their Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision standards of banking regulation, which formulates 
broad supervisory standards, guidelines and recommendations, provides socially 
constructed meaning to technocratic measures like ‘risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios’ 
(Porter, 2002). The BIS regulatory standards are an archetypal example of a focal point for 
the institutional ‘rules of the banking game’. Importantly, however, they should not be 
considered to be in any way objective or divorced from meaning and interpretation. For 
both financial market participants and national supervisory institutions, these rules may 
have an extraordinarily powerful legitimating social effect, albeit unique to the respective 
type of agent. For national domestic supervisory and regulatory authorities, these Basel 
rules provide a convenient reference point and are used extremely effectively in both 
political dialogue and public representations to justify their application. For financial 
market agents too, legitimacy enters in a different and interesting way. The appeals to the 
objective legitimacy of these rules have the potential effect of stripping out the normative 
components of financial agents’ subjective game models. In other words, financial actors 
are likely to interpret these Basel guidelines as the only relevant rules of the institutional 
game, and that as long as they are being adhered to, financial agents need not consider the 
normative implications of their possibly anti-social behaviour. Thus, financial actors might 
perceive a green light for any activity that does not strictly contradict these rules. It is 
therefore not surprising that in the post-GFC world, the recent Basel III rules attempt to 
include principles of corporate governance (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2010), effectively trying to insert new normative content into financial actors’ game 
models. Whether or not these voluntary codes are adopted is likely to be determined by the 
extent to which they form an institutional equilibrium for financial market agents, who 
tend to have a significant incentive to free ride. It will provide an interesting test case of 
the effectiveness of informal sanctioning amongst industry participants in a prisoners 
dilemma type game.  
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6.2 Paradigms, Ideas, and Financial Regulatory Regimes  
If we accept the argument that socially constructed legitimating norms provided by 
international organisations influence financial regulatory institutions at the domestic level, 
the question then becomes, what are the processes underlying the formulation of this 
international regulatory policy paradigm? One argument suggests that the interaction of 
macroeconomic policy elites and the strategic use of ideas at the international level 
produce a perceived financial regulatory orthodoxy. Hall (1993) describes how the terms 
used in political discourse may lead to the privileging of some policies over others, and 
that a persistent feature of political decision-making is conflict within prevailing terms of 
discourse, as well as competing attempts to alter these terms of discourse. Power is not 
exerted by organised interests, political parties and policy elites in a purely ‘weight of 
numbers’ sense, but is used and acquired by influencing political discourse and setting 
agendas, which are distinctly socially-constructed phenomena. Policy paradigms represent 
a particular set of ideas about what can and should be done in a sphere of policy, as well as 
acting to set the agenda for discourse. An example of this is the case of Hedge fund 
regulation in the EU following the GFC. Prior to the GFC, even though the activities of 
hedge funds in Europe fell under EU legislation, hedge funds and hedge fund managers 
were not regulated at the EU level. There were intermittent calls from various national 
government for regulation, but according to the European Commission, 
 “The prevailing view amongst industry experts is that the valuation of hedge 
fund assets is not an issue that can be addressed by legislation or the 
imposition of a requirement for an independent third party.” (European 
Commission, 2006, p.32) 
The Commission even further suggested that, 
“The development of sophisticated financial products has created a virtuous 
circle” (European Commission), 2006, p.32) 
This view was predominantly a reflection of the largely British supported laissez faire 
approach to financial regulation, which was influential amongst EU policy elites at that 
time (Quaglia, 2011). However, as a result of the GFC, this model of financial regulation 
came to be perceived by these elites as discredited, and by 2010, an EU directive regarding 
the regulation of Alternative Investment Fund Managers had been approved by the EU 
Parliament. It is also worth noting the change in view of the EC, outlined in the 
Commission’s proposal, suggesting that hedge fund strategies, 
“are vulnerable to some or several important risks in relation to investors, 
other market participants and markets.” (European Commission, 2009)  
Whether or not this policy change will result in the desired outcomes is outside the scope 
of this paper, but it is clear that so swift a turnaround in the terms of discourse and ideas of 
orthodoxy amongst EU elites, goes beyond changes the material circumstances and 
structural causes. 
 
Changes in paradigm, however, are not limited to financial regulatory discourse amongst 
elites at the international level. Socially constructed ideas and ideologies amongst networks 
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of corporate finance managers and financiers regarding theories of the firm and modes of 
work/corporate/industrial strategy and organisation are directly linked to discourse 
regarding financial regulation. For example, following the publication of Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm for understanding corporate 
governance, amongst both academic economists and management specialists, especially in 
the US, was in the context of agency theory (Zorn, Dobbin, Dierkes and Kwok, 2004).  
When managerial and professional networks and business groups possess their own ideas 
regarding the appropriate relationship between a firm’s owners, financiers and 
management, these theories can often be self-fulfilling. These models of management are 
by no means inevitable or determined, and can often be influenced by new participants into 
the discourse. For example, Zorn et al (2004) argue that from around the mid-1980s, a new 
model of corporate governance became more prevalent - that governance was socially 
constructed and diffused throughout networks of managers, and that dialogue surrounding 
this new paradigm was heavily influenced by financial market participants who were 
external to the firm. Firms that were involved in hostile takeovers came to be viewed as 
legitimate enforcers of efficiency and as agents of discipline for poor management. 
Institutional investors, such as pension funds, also embraced agency theory and according 
to Jung and Dobbin (2012), popularised their ideas through a regime of intense dialogue, 
persuading initially resistant corporate leaders to the new paradigm with its sole focus on 
maximising shareholder wealth. This paradigm thus became entrenched in the financial 
regulatory discourse, with its focus on shareholder primacy.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper set out to better understand and to establish explanations for the diversity of 
financial regulatory regimes observed across capitalist economies – roughly between those 
that support bank-based finance and those that support markets-based finance. Applying a 
multi-level institutional approach, which is able to relatively coherently combine elements 
of comparative political economy, comparative institutional economics and social 
constructivism, a number of interesting factors present themselves as determining why 
particular financial regulatory regimes occur in some places and not in others.  
 
At the formal institutional level, fundamental constitution-status institutions, like a nation’s 
electoral rules or legal system, have been argued to significantly affect regulatory policies. 
It may be true in theory that the existence of either a centrifugal or a centripetal electoral 
system can generate incentives for politicians to appeal to a different set of political 
interests, and in the case of financial regulation, favour financial interests in proportional 
systems, and consumer interests in majoritarian systems. However, this relationship is only 
tentatively supported by cross-country statistical evidence. Furthermore, there is little 
evidence to suggest that changes in electoral rules in Japan during the 1990s have yet had a 
discernible effect in financial regulation in that nation. Many researchers have also been 
drawn to the observation that Anglo-sphere economies that share a common heritage in 
English common law, seem to exhibit similar patterns of financial regulation. In particular, 
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that they tend to provide more substantial support for the dispersion of share ownership. 
However, attributing this to the effect of legal institutions may be flawed for two reasons. 
Firstly, the underlying mechanisms suggested appear somewhat questionable, as both the 
‘political’ and ‘adaptability’ hypotheses rely heavily on the assumption that civil law 
jurisdictions are worse at enforcing and maintaining property rights. Secondly, there may 
be reason to believe that an unobserved common cause may be producing the statistical 
correlation.    
 
In reality it seems naïve to suggest that a single institutional explanation could adequately 
describe patterns of financial regulatory regimes across nations. Therefore, modern 
capitalist financial regimes should be understood as forming but one part of a more or less 
coherent synchronic constellation of complementary economic institutions. Within the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ literature, it is generally argued that coordinated market economies 
are associated with more centralised bank-based financial systems, and liberal market 
economies with markets-based financial systems. The nexus, through which the different 
types of financial system provide complementarities with other institutional spheres, is 
generally suggested to be through corporate governance. This is said to generate ‘insider’ 
or ‘outsider’ systems, which provide differing types of incentives to managers of firms. 
This is likely to be true; however, assumptions regarding the exact mechanism that 
constitutes the nexus between corporate finance and corporate governance are often not 
fully articulated. Furthermore, the relationship between financial regulatory institutions 
and the corporate finance-corporate governance nexus is not thoroughly examined.  
 
The model described in Section 3.2, attempts to more explicitly describe the mechanism 
underlying this corporate finance-corporate governance nexus, while allowing for varying 
complementary effects of different financial regulatory regimes. It is based on the power of 
financial stakeholders, in particular the control rights provided by a regulatory regime. 
These are differentiated in the context of Albert O. Hirschman’s distinction between ‘exit’ 
and ‘voice’ strategies. One of the conclusions of this model is that the relative liquidity and 
associated transaction costs of the market for corporate control provided by a financial 
regulatory regime will determine whether the owners of firms and investors will coordinate 
using either a i)  market-based managerial incentives and exit-based quality signals, or ii) 
reputational managerial incentives and voice-based quality signals. The former 
corresponds with ‘outsider’ corporate governance, the latter with an ‘insider’ system. The 
second conclusion of the model is that complementarities exist between ‘outsider’ systems 
and financial regulation that promotes a liquid market for corporate control and ownership 
diffusion, or between ‘insider’ systems and financial regulation that restricts certain 
financial market activities – a conclusion that mirrors the standard argument in the 
comparative institutional literature. Further research in this area might focus on individual 
national cases, for example focusing on regulation-related (implicit or explicit) transaction 
costs in the market for corporate control, and how these affect corporate governance. 
 
Complementarities at the formal institutional level afford explanations for why financial 
regulatory regimes exist in parallel with other economic institutions, but only provide 
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limited information regarding the diachronic processes underlying the establishment of 
these equilibria. Heterogeneity of interests may cause agents to attempt to affect change in 
the formal institutional architecture as an expression of collective action, thus financial 
regulatory regimes are often a function of the preferences and the power of organised 
interests as reflected in their collective action capabilities. In the case of traditional banks, 
the standard argument is that their preferences over financial regulation can be assumed to 
be for weaker restrictions on risk-taking behaviour. However, there are two reasons why 
this may not necessarily be true. Firstly, some financial regulatory measures can act to 
discourage new financial entrants and supress competition in the financial sector, thereby 
increasing incumbent rents. Secondly, non-binding or ineffective financial regulation can 
act to create a false perception of safety amongst bank depositors, thereby reducing bank 
funding costs. Deposit insurance schemes have a similar effect, and despite the moral 
hazard implications, the apparent coalition of interests between the average retail depositor 
and the banking industry is powerful worldwide. In addition to traditional banks, recent 
decades have seen the emergence of “market-banking” – a non-traditional intermediation 
model involving tradeable financial securities rather than loans and deposits – which has 
prompted an acute re-examination of regulation, especially of hedge funds and the 
“shadow banking” industry. Furthermore, there appear to be three main factors that may 
explain why regulation of hedge funds and ‘shadow banking’ was weak in some 
jurisdictions, yet stronger in others.  The pre-existence of ‘outsider’ finance, a relatively 
high influence of the ancillary financial services sector, and a relatively high rate 
mortgages amongst households all appear to have contributed to a minimalist approach to 
financial regulation in this case.  In addition to rates of household mortgage borrowing, the 
general trend towards the ‘privatisation of risk’, whereby formerly publicly funded services 
like pension schemes have been transferred onto the balance sheets of households, appears 
to have significantly altered the underlying political-economic equilibrium in many 
economies. So much so that, it was centre-left political parties in many nations who 
spearheaded pro-shareholder and pro-financial market regulatory reform – seizing the 
opportunity to make new political alliances with organised financial interests, as well as 
appealing to middle-class voters. 
 
Private interests clearly have a stake in affecting change in the formal institutional 
regulatory architecture of the financial sphere. However, these effects also appear to be to a 
large extent mediated and refracted by informal norms and social constructs, which impose 
on the material context of action. Firstly, informal norms that establish the legitimacy of 
certain behaviours in financial markets, or the legitimacy of financial relationships, appear 
to be influential in determining regulatory regimes. In other words, these constitutive 
legitimating norms provide support for the formal financial regulatory structure. 
Importantly, prominent international organisations, such as the IMF, BIS and OECD are a 
powerful force in disseminating meaning for regulatory tools, and defining for their 
members what constitute legitimate policies. Secondly, socially constructed policy 
paradigms, which represent inter-subjectively held beliefs and shared sets of ideas, can also 
structure discourse in a particular way and define a policy agenda. Indeed, an examination 
of the discourse of the European Commission regarding the regulation of hedge funds 
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highlights the delegitimising force of the GFC on the formerly influential laissez faire 
policy paradigm. There is also reason to argue that, in addition to those amongst policy 
elites, paradigms of  behaviour and social organisation amongst both financial market 
participants and managerial elites can act to influence the values and goals of corporate 
strategy. 
 
Overall, this paper reveals that an explanation for the determinants of a financial regulatory 
regime is unlikely to be reduced to one, or even a small number of factors. Instead, 
financial regulatory regimes must be understood in wider institutional, historical 
institutional, political economic, social and international contexts. They must be 
understood as representing the complex interactive process of feedback between these 
elements. This paper nonetheless reveals the salient factors and channels that must be 
considered when examining the context specific information of a particular national 
economy, if one is hoping to gain a more complete perspective on the diversity of financial 
regulatory regimes. 
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Appendix A: A Model of Exit and Voice in the Corporate Governance-
Finance Nexus 
1. Investors: 
Consider the choice between exit and voice for a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected 
utility maximising investor. In this framework, an investor is faced with the prospect of the 
expected cash flows ‘C’ of a corporate asset generated in perpetuity falling by a scaled 
amount, 
$ 
giving them an expected cash flow of 
(1 − )$ 
Here α can broadly represent the degree of managerial agency costs (principle-agent 
problem).  
 
Faced with this deterioration in performance, they face the possibility of either exercising 
their property right of disposal (exit), or their property right of control (voice). In the case 
of voice, they face a Downsian style paradox, where the expected benefit of pursuing 
change depends on the likelihood that they will be a decisive voice. If this likelihood is the 
probability, p, then their expected payoff from this strategy is 
$ + (1 − )((1 − )$) 
 In the case of the exit strategy, the investor receives sells their claim on the firm, but 
incurs some transaction cost ‘t’ which depends on the liquidity of financial markets.  They 
therefore receive a payoff of 
(1 − 
)$ 
This provides us with the conditions under which investors will choose either strategy as a 
function of the expected decline, and the transaction cost. Specifically, agents will choose 
voice if 
 >  − 
  
A higher transaction cost ‘t’ decreases the probability of decisiveness ‘p’ that is required 
for an investor to choose voice. When an investor faces a low p, either t must be relatively 
low, or α must be relatively high. 
 
 
2. Owners: 
Owners also want to maximise their payoff 
(1 − )$ 
and can do so by attempting to minimise the managerial agency costs, α. Assuming this 
can be done equally well by either attaching managerial incentives to the stock price, or 
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directly monitoring through long-term relationships, owners choose from a discrete 
variable ‘M’. Share-based incentives take the value 1, while direct incentives take the 
value -1. The value of alpha is determined by the interaction of the managerial decision, 
and the Hirshmanian information provision by investors, which also take the form of a 
discrete variable ‘I’, where information based on exit takes the value 1, and information 
based on voice takes the value -1. The degree of managerial agency can be calculated as 
 = )1 −* ∙ , - +  
where θ represents the effect of imperfect incentive alignment and is assumed to be less 
than 1.  
δ represents the sensitivity of the firm’s performance to poor management incentives. In 
other words, when managerial incentives are linked to share price and investors provide 
accurate information via exit, or when owners rely on information from the voice of long-
term investors to provide incentives,  = .  
Otherwise, agency costs are exacerbated by an amount greater than θ, depending on δ. 
 
 
3. Equilibrium: 
The payoff matrix corresponding to this game is shown in Figure A1 
 
  Owners 
 strategy Share-price incentives Direct incentives 
In
v
es
to
rs
 
Exit 
Investors:  (1 − 
)$  
 
Owners:  )1 − ./0∙12 + 3-$ 
(1 − 
)$  
 
 )1 − ./0∙12 + 3-$ 
Voice 
 $ + (1 − ) )1 − ./0∙12 + 3-$ 
 
 )1 − ./0∙12 + 3-$ 
 $ + (1 − ) )1 − ./0∙12 + 3-$ 
 
 )1 − ./0∙12 + 3-$ 
 
 
 
 
 
